Targeting Terrorist Leaders by Rowe, Stephen Charles
Bates College
SCARAB
Honors Theses Capstone Projects
5-2018
Targeting Terrorist Leaders
Stephen Charles Rowe
Bates College, srowe@bates.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scarab.bates.edu/honorstheses
This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Capstone Projects at SCARAB. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses
by an authorized administrator of SCARAB. For more information, please contact batesscarab@bates.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rowe, Stephen Charles, "Targeting Terrorist Leaders" (2018). Honors Theses. 249.
https://scarab.bates.edu/honorstheses/249
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Targeting	Terrorist	Leaders	
	
	
An	Honors	Thesis	
Presented	to	
The	Faculty	of	the	Department	of	Politics	
Bates	College	
	
	
In	partial	fulfillment	of	the	requirement	for	the		
Degree	of	Bachelor	of	Arts		
	
	
By	Stephen	Rowe	
	
	
Lewiston,	Maine	
March	28,	2018	
	
	
	
	 i	
	
Acknowledgments	
	 I	would	like	to	thank	my	thesis	advisor,	Professor	Will	d’Ambruoso	for	the	countless	
hours	he	has	assisted	and	supported	me	throughout	the	thesis	process.	Without	him	this	
project	would	not	exist.	I	would	also	like	to	thank	Emily	Bacon	for	the	time	she	spent	
helping	me	with	formatting	issues,	Olin	Carty	for	his	help	with	evaluating	the	Global	
Terrorism	Database’s	data,	Jack	McWilliams	and	Rob	Flynn	for	all	of	their	help	and	support,	
Owen	Schmitt	for	being	my	emotional	rock,	and	Vanessa	Paolella	for	always	being	there	for	
me.	Finally,	I	would	like	to	thank	my	family	for	their	belief	in	me	and	their	support	for	my	
Bates	experience.			 	
	 ii	
Abstract		
Nearly	every	country	engaged	in	counterterrorism	campaigns	includes	leadership	
targeting	as	a	key	pillar	of	its	counterterrorism	strategy.	However,	the	effectiveness	of	
leadership	removal	in	reducing	the	lethality	of	terrorist	organizations	is	fiercely	debated	in	
the	academic	community.	This	thesis	contributes	to	this	field	by	examining	how	varying	
levels	of	charismatic	authority	and	institutionalization	within	a	terrorist	group	interact	to	
impact	the	outcome	of	leadership	removal	on	a	terrorist	organization’s	operational	
capacity.	I	find	that	leadership	removal	is	rarely	an	effective	military	strategy	for	degrading	
the	operational	capacity	of	a	terrorist	organization,	working	successfully	only	on	terrorist	
groups	that	are	highly	dependent	on	charismatic	authority	and	have	a	weak	institutional	
structure.	However,	leadership	removal,	particularly	within	terrorist	groups	that	have	both	
high	levels	of	charismatic	authority	and	institutionalization,	causes	political	change	within	
terrorist	groups	that,	depending	on	the	internal	dynamics	of	that	group,	can	have	either	
positive	or	negative	implications	for	counterterrorism	policy.			
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Introduction 
	
In	the	aftermath	of	the	September	11th	attacks,	President	George	W.	Bush	called	on	
the	Taliban	government	in	Afghanistan	to	hand	over	the	leadership	of	Al	Qaeda	and	
promised	the	American	people	that	the	United	States	would	hunt	down	the	leaders	of	Al	
Qaeda	wherever	they	might	be.1		In	2008,	Barrack	Obama	made	the	finding	and	killing	or	
capturing	of	Osama	Bin	Laden,	the	leader	of	Al	Qaeda,	a	key	campaign	pledge	that	he	
fulfilled	in	2010.2	In	2016,	presidential	candidate	Hillary	Clinton	promised	that,	if	elected,	
she	would	find	and	kill	the	leaders	of	ISIS.3	This	emphasis	on	targeting	terrorist	leaders	as	a	
way	of	combating	terrorism	has	been	at	the	forefront	of	the	United	States’	
counterterrorism	policy	for	the	last	twenty	years.		
Targeting	terrorist	leaders	is	not	only	a	US	counterterrorism	response	but	also	a	
global	reaction	by	states	to	terrorism.	After	the	Moscow	apartment	building	bombings,	
Russian	President	Vladimir	Putin	promised	to	have	the	leaders	of	the	Chechen	terrorist	
organization	responsible	“rubbed	out,	even	if	they’re	on	the	outhouse.”4	Israeli	Prime	
Minister	Benjamin	Netanyahu	explicitly	warned	terrorist	organizations	that	if	Israel	was	
attacked,	they	would	respond	by	hunting	down	and	removing	the	leaders	of	those	
																																								 																					
1	George	W.	Bush,	“Address	to	the	Nation	on	9-11-01”	American	Rhetoric.	
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbush911addresstothenation.htm		
2	Barrack	Obama,	Second	Presidential	Debate,	Oct.	7th,	2008.		
3	Spencer	Ackerman,	“Hillary	Clinton’s	plan	to	stop	Isis:	hunt	down	leader	Abu	Bakr	al-
Baghdadi,”	The	Guardian.	September	23rd,	2016.		
4	Owen	Matthews,	“Why	Russia’s	Reaction	to	Terrorism	is	All	About	Strengthening	Putin’s	
Power.”	Newsweek,	April	10th,	2017.	
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organizations	responsible.5	Across	the	globe,	despite	differences	in	regimes	and	governing	
philosophies,	states	that	are	the	victims	of	terrorist	attacks	make	leadership	removal	a	key	
counterterrorism	policy.	The	default	global	response	to	terrorism	is	leadership	removal.		
The	logic	underlying	leadership	removal	is:	If	the	head	of	a	terrorist	organization	is	
eliminated	then	that	organization	will	be	significantly	less	capable	of	planning	and	
executing	lethal	terrorist	attacks.	However,	the	empirical	evidence	on	the	effectiveness	of	
targeting	terrorist	organizations’	leaders	is	mixed,	providing	unclear	guidance	for	
policymakers.		
The	school	of	thought	that	supports	leadership	removal	as	a	counterterrorism	
strategy	argues	that	a	terrorist	organization’s	unique	reliance	on	charismatic	authority	
makes	it	particularly	vulnerable	to	leadership	removal.6	This	argument	claims	that	
terrorist	organizations	must	rely	on	charismatic	authority	to	hold	their	organization	
together	and,	since	charismatic	authority	is	not	easily	replaced,	leadership	removal	
presents	an	existential	crisis	for	terrorist	organizations	because	it	challenges	their	
legitimacy	in	the	eyes	of	their	followers.	This	argument	is	heavily	criticized	by	scholars	who	
oppose	the	use	of	leadership	removal	as	a	counterterrorism	strategy	for	overstating	the	
importance	of	charismatic	authority	within	terrorist	organizations.		
																																								 																					
5	Toi	Staff,	“Netanyahu	warns	terror	groups:	Don’t	even	think	about	it,”	The	Times	of	Israel.	
November	12th,	2017.	
6	See	Bryan	Price,	“Targeting	Top	Terrorists,”	International	Security,	Vol.	36,	No.	4,	2012,	9-
46,	and	David	Hofmann,	“The	Influence	of	Charismatic	Authority	on	Operational	Strategies	
and	Attack	Outcomes	of	Terrorist	Groups,”	Journal	of	Strategic	Security,	Vol.	9,	No.	2,	2016,	
14-44.	
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Scholars	who	oppose	the	use	of	leadership	removal	as	a	counterterrorism	strategy	
tend	to	substantiate	their	arguments	through	the	ideas	of	organizational	resilience.7	These	
arguments	claim	that	terrorist	organizations	are	not	all	that	different	from	other	
organizations	that	employ	political	violence.	Terrorist	groups,	and	in	particular	large	and	
established	terrorist	groups,	will	have	complicated	institutional	structures	that	allow	them	
to	easily	replace	lost	leaders	and	have	their	overall	operational	capacity	unaffected	by	
leadership	removal.		
The	theories	that	focus	on	the	importance	of	charismatic	authority	and	those	that	
focus	on	institutionalization	in	a	terrorist	group	are	often	viewed	as	mutually	exclusive.	
Terrorist	groups	are	either	secretive	organizations	that	are	entirely	dependent	on	
charismatic	authority	to	bind	them	together	or	they	are	well-structured	and	heavily	
institutionalized	organizations	,where	leaders	are	little	more	than	transactional	pieces	of	a	
greater	machine.	This	thesis,	however,	argues	that	notions	of	charismatic	authority	and	
institutionalization	are	not	mutually	exclusive	within	terrorist	groups.	Instead,	terrorist	
groups	contain	varying	levels	of	charismatic	authority	and	institutionalization	and	this	
influences	how	they	respond	to	leadership	removal.						
The	goal	of	this	thesis	is	to	provide	a	greater	understanding	into	how	the	variables	
of	charismatic	authority	and	institutionalization	interact	within	a	terrorist	group	to	
influence	the	effects	of	leadership	removal.	To	do	this,	this	thesis	examines	terrorist	
organizations	with	varying	levels	of	dependency	on	charismatic	authority	and	
																																								 																					
7	See	Jenna	Jordan,	“Attacking	the	Leader,	Missing	the	Mark,”	International	Security,	Vol.	38,	
No.	4,	2014,	7-38,	and	Lisa	Langdon,	Alexander	J.	Sarapu,	and	Matthew	Wells,	“Targeting	
the	Leadership	of	Terrorist	and	Insurgent	Movements:	Historical	Lessons	for	
Contemporary	Policy	Makers,”	Journal	of	Public	and	International	Affairs.	Vol.	15	2004,	59-
78.		
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institutionalization	and	shows	how	these	two	variables	determine	if	the	operational	
capacity	of	a	terrorist	organization	is	harmed	by	leadership	removal.			
In	this	thesis,	I	argue	that	leadership	removal	is	rarely	an	effective	way	to	degrade	
the	operational	capacity	of	terrorist	groups.	Leadership	removal	is	remarkably	ineffective	
at	reducing	a	terrorist	group’s	underlining	operational	capacity,	working	only	in	terrorist	
organizations	that	are	heavily	reliant	on	charismatic	authority	with	a	weak	institutional	
structure.	Instead,	the	greatest	impacts	of	leadership	removal	are	political.	The	loss	of	a	
leader	forces	political	change	within	a	terrorist	group	and	the	results	of	this	political	
change	can	have	either	positive	or	negative	counterterrorism	policy	implications	based	on	
the	internal	dynamics	of	the	terrorist	group.		
Chapter	I	of	this	thesis	focuses	on	the	theoretical	background	and	reviews	the	
literature	on	leadership	removal.	In	this	chapter,	I	explain	the	competing	theories	on	
terrorist	group	organization,	and	I	explore	the	arguments	made	by	major	authors	in	the	
fields	and	their	critiques	of	each	other’s	work.		
Chapter	2	outlines	the	methods	and	research	design	of	this	thesis.	In	this	section,	I	
explain	and	justify	the	cases	selected	in	this	thesis,	define	relevant	terms,	layout	the	key	
variables	used	in	this	thesis,	and	show	how	those	variables	are	measured.		
Chapter	3	examines	the	effects	of	leadership	removal	on	the	operational	capacity	of	
Aum	Shinrikyo.	Aum	Shinrikyo	was	a	large	Japanese	terrorist	organization	that	was	highly	
dependent	on	the	charismatic	authority	of	its	leader,	Shoko	Asahara,	and	lacked	a	strong	
institutional	structure.	It	was	also	notable	for	being	the	only	terrorist	organization	to	use	
weapons	of	mass	destruction.	I	find	that,	in	line	with	the	theoretical	understanding,	
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leadership	removal	decimated	the	operational	capacity	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	and	quickly	led	to	
organizational	collapse.		
Chapter	4	examines	the	effects	of	leadership	removal	on	the	operational	capacity	of	
Hamas.	Hamas	is	a	large	terrorist	organization	that	is	not	highly	dependent	on	charismatic	
authority,	but	is	incredibly	institutionalized	and	well-structured.	It	operates	in	Israel,	the	
West	Bank,	and	the	Gaza	Strip.	Here,	again,	I	find	that	the	impact	of	leadership	removal	
follows	the	theoretical	arguments.	The	loss	of	its	leaders	did	not	negatively	impact	the	
operational	capacity	of	Hamas	and	ultimately	ended	up	strengthening	its	position.		
Chapter	5	examines	the	impact	of	leadership	removal	on	the	PKK.	The	PKK	is	a	
Kurdish	insurgent	organization	that	engages	in	terrorist	attacks	to	further	its	political	goal	
of	creating	a	Kurdish	state.	The	organization	at	the	time	of	leadership	removal	was	both	
highly	dependent	on	the	charismatic	authority	of	its	leader	and	incredibly	institutionalized	
and	well-structured.	In	this	case,	I	find	that	while	leadership	removal	did	not	reduce	the	
underlying	operational	capacity	of	the	PKK,	it	did	force	political	changes	within	the	group	
that	led	to	positive	counterterrorism	policy	developments.		
Chapter	6	examines	the	case	of	leadership	removal	in	Al	Qaeda.	Al	Qaeda	is	a	large	
transnational	terrorist	organization	that,	like	the	PKK,	was	heavily	reliant	on	the	
charismatic	authority	of	its	leader,	Osama	Bin	Laden,	while	also	having	a	sophisticated	
institutional	structure	to	support	the	organization.	Again,	I	find	that	leadership	removal	did	
not	reduce	the	operational	capacity	of	Al	Qaeda,	but	did	force	political	change	within	the	
organization.	However,	unlike	the	PKK,	this	political	change	did	not	lead	to	a	decrease	in	
the	lethality	of	Al	Qaeda,	but	instead	made	the	organization	more	violent	and	more	
regionally	focused.		
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The	last	section	of	this	thesis	is	the	conclusion.	Here	I	claim	that	leadership	removal	
needs	to	be	reevaluated	and	used	not	as	a	military	tool	to	degrade	the	operational	capacity	
of	terrorist	organizations,	but	rather	as	a	political	strategy	to	modify	terrorist	
organizations.	I	also	lay	out	other	areas	for	further	research.				
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Chapter I 
	
The	Theory	of	Leadership	Removal	
The	efficacy	of	leadership	removal	on	a	terrorist	organization’s	operational	capacity	
is	a	contentious	subject.	Governments	and	military	officials	tend	to	be	ardent	supporters	of	
leadership	targeting.	Meanwhile,	academics	have	tended	to	be	more	critical	of	the	efficacy	
of	leadership	removal	as	a	means	of	degrading	terrorist	organizations.	Each	side	has	
developed	its	own	theoretical	framework	to	support	its	case.	These	theories	are	heavily	
focused	on	organizational	structure,	borrowing	from	the	fields	of	economics	and	sociology.	
Supporters	of	leadership	removal	tend	to	draw	heavily	from	theories	on	charismatic	
authority,	while	detractors	draw	from	theories	of	organizational	resilience.		
The	foundational	puzzle	for	both	the	supporters	and	detractors	of	leadership	
targeting	is,	why	do	leaders	matter?	Practically	every	government	in	conflict	with	terrorist	
groups	pursues	leadership	targeting	as	a	counterterrorism	strategy.	However,	
governments	typically	don’t	apply	leadership	targeting	as	a	strategy	when	in	conflict	with	
another	state.	What	makes	the	leaders	of	terrorist	organizations	different?	
Charismatic	Leadership	Theory	
Supporters	of	leadership	targeting	argue	that	terrorist	organizations’	structures	
leave	them	uniquely	vulnerable	to	the	death	or	capture	of	their	leaders.	Terrorist	
organizations	are	in	asymmetric	power	arrangements,	in	which	the	states	that	they	are	
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fighting	have	significantly	more	capacity	than	they	do.	To	compensate	for	their	lack	of	
power,	terrorist	organizations	are	secretive	and	opaque.8	They	blend	in	with	the	general	
population,	making	it	harder	for	the	state	security	apparatus	to	determine	who	is	a	
member	of	a	terrorist	organization	and	who	is	a	citizen.9	While	this	structure	helps	
terrorist	organizations	adapt	to	the	asymmetry	of	power,	it	also	restricts	how	terrorist	
organizations	can	be	structured.		
In	his	groundbreaking	work	on	leadership	structures,	Max	Weber	argued	that	there	
are	three	types	of	authority	around	which	to	structure	an	organization:	tradition,	
rational/legal,	and	charismatic.10	In	order	for	an	organization	to	be	successful	in	mobilizing	
individuals	to	complete	its	goals,	one	of	these	types	of	authority	needs	to	be	present.		
An	organization	possesses	traditional	authority	when	it	is	based	on	long	standing	
traditions,	norms,	and	cultural	customs.	The	classic	example	of	an	organization	structured	
around	traditional	authority	is	the	English	monarchy.	The	English	monarchy	is	incredibly	
old,	steeped	in	tradition,	and	has	been	an	essential	part	of	the	English	culture.	All	of	these	
factors	allow	the	English	monarchy	to	be	a	source	of	traditional	authority	to	this	day.		
Terrorist	organizations,	on	the	other	hand,	typically	lack	the	factors	necessary	to	
create	strong	traditional	authority	within	their	organization.	While	terrorist	organizations	
are	not	a	new	phenomenon,	individual	terrorist	organizations	typically	don’t	last	longer	
than	a	century,	making	it	hard	for	them	to	have	the	background	to	establish	strong	
traditional	authority.11	Additionally,	while	norms	and	cultural	customs	certainly	exist	
																																								 																					
8	Bryan	Price,	“Targeting	Top	Terrorists,”	International	Security,	Vol.	36,	No.	4,	2012,	18-19.	
9	Ibid,	18-19	
10	Max	Weber,	On	Charisma	and	Institution	Building,	S.N.	Eisenstadt,	(Chicago:	University	of	
Chicago	Press,	1968,	48.		
11	Bryan	Price,	“Targeting	Top	Terrorists,”	14-17.	
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within	terrorist	organizations,	they	are	weaker	than	the	norms	and	cultural	customs	found	
within	organizations	with	the	capacity	to	engage	in	state	building.12	The	nature	of	terrorist	
organizations	makes	them	weak	sources	of	traditional	authority.		
The	most	common	type	of	authority	in	organizations	is	rational/legal.	Rational/legal	
authority	is	derived	through	an	agreed	process	through	which	laws	are	created	and	
enforced.13	Thinking	back	to	the	Great	Britain	example,	an	organization	in	that	country	
with	rational/legal	authority	would	be	parliament	and	the	police	force.	Parliament	is	how	
the	sovereign	people	of	Great	Britain	agreed	that	they	would	be	governed,	which	in	turns	
makes	legitimate	coercive	use	of	force	by	the	police	to	uphold	the	law.		
Terrorist	organizations	also	typically	lack	strong	rational/legal	authority.	The	two	
key	pillars	that	uphold	rational/legal	authority	are	legitimate	rules	and	enforceability.14	
Terrorist	organizations	are	weak	in	both	pillars.	For	rules	to	be	legitimate,	they	have	to	be	
created	in	a	standardized	and	agreed	upon	way.	This	is	difficult	for	terrorist	organizations	
because,	in	order	to	conduct	their	organizations	activities	in	secret	from	the	states	that	are	
trying	to	dismantle	them,	they	lack	high	levels	of	institutionalization.15	This	makes	them	
different	from	organizations	with	strong	rational/legal	authority,	all	of	which	have	high	
level	of	institutionalization	that	provides	them	with	authority.16	Terrorist	organizations	
also	lack	strong	enforcement	powers.	Terrorist	organizations	lack	the	capacity	of	states,	
which	means	their	ability	to	assert	their	authority	over	individuals	is	much	less	than	that	of	
																																								 																					
12	David	Hofmann,	“The	Influence	of	Charismatic	Authority	on	Operational	Strategies	and	
Attack	Outcomes	of	Terrorist	Groups,”	Journal	of	Strategic	Security,	Vol.	9,	No.	2,	2016,	14-
21.		
13	Max	Weber,	On	Charisma	and	Institution	Building.	1968.		
14	Ibid,	1968.		
15	Bryan	Price,	“Targeting	Top	Terrorists”	16.		
16	Max	Weber,	On	Charisma	and	Institution	Building,	1968.			
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state	organizations.17	Overall,	terrorist	organizations	lack	the	foundation	for	obtaining	
strong	rational/legal	authority.		
The	weakness	of	terrorist	organizations	to	build	traditional	or	rational/legal	
authority	leaves	them	with	only	charismatic	authority	around	which	to	build	their	
organization.		The	key	factor	for	an	organization	that	is	built	around	charismatic	authority	
is	its	leader.	A	leader	who	has	charismatic	authority	is	considered	to	be	superior	to	an	
ordinary	man	by	the	followers	of	the	leader.18	Followers	are	willing	to	commit	themselves	
to	that	leader	and	all	followers	feel	a	deep	personal	connection	to	their	leader,	even	if	they	
have	never	met	before.19	While	this	type	of	authority	has	the	least	structure	to	it,	it	is	
considered	the	most	powerful	in	its	ability	to	mobilize	people.		
Terrorist	organizations	rely	heavily	on	charismatic	authority.	The	ability	to	mobilize	
individuals	without	a	concrete	organizational	structure	is	appealing	to	terrorist	groups	
because	it	allows	them	to	recruit	members	without	the	risk	of	exposing	the	organization.		
Devotion	to	a	charismatic	leader	also	helps	overcome	collective	action	problems.	The	risks	
involved	with	joining	a	terrorist	organization	are	much	higher	than	the	potential	rewards.	
This	poses	a	major	problem	for	terrorist	recruitment,	but	charismatic	authority	overcomes	
this	problem	by	changing	the	framework	through	which	an	individual	evaluates	his/her	
self-interest.20	Followers	of	charismatic	leaders	define	their	self-interest	as	the	interests	of	
the	leader	or	the	leader’s	vision.21	This	makes	many	actions	that	appear	irrational	to	
																																								 																					
17	Bryan	Price,	“Targeting	Top	Terrorists”	16-17.		
18	David	Hofmann,	“The	Influence	of	Charismatic	Authority	on	Operational	Strategies	and	
Attack	Outcomes	of	Terrorist	Groups.”	Journal	of	Strategic	Security.	Vol.	9,	No.	2.	2016,	20.		
19	Ibid,	20.		
20	Ibid,	20.		
21	David	Hofmann,	“The	Influence	of	Charismatic	Authority	on	Operational	Strategies	and	
Attack	Outcomes	of	Terrorist	Groups.”	20.		
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outside	observers,	such	as	suicide	bombings,	rational	to	individuals	under	charismatic	
authority.	This	is	why	so	many	of	the	most	lethal	and	effective	terrorist	organizations	in	
history	have	been	headed	by	charismatic	leaders	such	as	Osama	Bin	Laden,	Shoko	Asahara,	
Abimael	Guzman,	and	Abdullah	Öcalan.		
Scholars	who	support	leadership	targeting	argue	that	terrorist	organizations’	heavy	
reliance	on	charismatic	authority	makes	them	ideal	for	leadership	targeting	programs.	
There	are	two	types	of	leaders,	transactional	and	charismatic.22	Transactional	leaders	are	
focused	on	managing	an	organization.	They	set	goals	for	individuals	and	set	benchmarks	
for	the	organization	to	hit.23	This	makes	them	easily	replaceable	since	the	skills	of	setting	
goals	and	benchmarks	are	not	exactly	unique.	Charismatic	leaders,	on	the	other	hand,	have	
to	have	all	the	previously	mentioned	skills	necessary	to	create	charismatic	authority.	This	
type	of	leader	cannot	simply	be	replaced.	The	ability	to	get	others	to	commit	themselves	
fully	to	a	leader	and	their	cause	is	not	common,	and	members	of	organizations	built	behind	
a	charismatic	leader	often	consider	themselves	committed	to	the	leader,	not	the	
organization.24	Thus,	the	removal	of	a	charismatic	leader	from	an	organization	built	around	
charismatic	authority	should	quickly	cause	that	organization	to	collapse.		
Charismatic	leader	theorists	have	tried	to	support	their	work	empirically.	Bryan	
Price,	one	of	the	strongest	advocates	for	the	use	of	leadership	removal	as	a	
counterterrorism	strategy,	conducted	a	quantitative	study	looking	at	hundreds	of	cases	of	
leadership	removal	through	a	database	he	designed	himself.	He	found	that	while	violence	
would	typically	spike	after	a	terrorist	organization	suffered	leadership	removal,	the	
																																								 																					
22	Bryan	Price,	“Targeting	Top	Terrorists,”	20-21.	
23	Ibid,	20	
24	Ibid,	21	
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duration	of	the	organization’s	life	span	would	be	significantly	shortened	by	leadership	
removal.25	Terrorist	organizations,	Price	concludes,	are	simply	unable	to	replace	their	
leaders,	which	causes	their	organizations	to	fall	apart.		
These	results	were	closely	corroborated	by	the	results	of	Patrick	Johnston.	He	found	
that	successful	counterterrorism	campaigns	almost	always	had	instances	of	leadership	
removal,	leadership	removal	would	lead	to	an	overall	decrease	in	violence	committed	by	a	
terrorist	organization,	and	leadership	removal	would	shorten	the	length	of	
counterterrorism	operations.26	This	is	similar	to	the	results	of	a	study	by	Jason	Brown,	who	
found	that	the	removal	of	Al	Qaeda	leaders	significantly	reduced	that	organization’s	
operational	capacity.27		
For	supporters	of	using	leadership	removal	as	a	counterterrorism	strategy,	it	is	
clear	that	terrorist	organizations	are	overly	reliant	on	their	leaders.	The	best	way	to	
counter	terrorist	organizations	is	to	remove	its	leaders,	as	the	organization	will	be	unable	
to	find	a	replacement	and	find	its	organizational	lifespan	and	operational	capacity	reduced.		
Critiques	of	Charismatic	Leadership	Theory	
There	are	several	critiques	leveled	at	the	charismatic	leader	theory	on	both	an	
empirical	and	theoretical	level.	First,	there	are	some	problems	with	the	empirical	work	
supporting	the	theory.	There	is	a	real	difficulty	in	establishing	causality	between	leadership	
removal	and	reductions	in	a	terrorist	organization’s	operational	capacity.	Max	Abrahms	
notes	that	leadership	removal	almost	never	takes	place	in	a	vacuum.	It	is	almost	always	
																																								 																					
25	Price,	“Targeting	Top	Terrorists”	43-44.		
26	Patrick	Johnston,	“Does	Decapitation	Work:	Assessing	the	Effectiveness	of	Leadership	
Targeting	in	Counterinsurgency	Campaigns,”	International	Security,	Vol	36,	No	4.,	2012,	47-
79		
27	Jason	Brown,	“To	Bomb	or	Not	to	Bomb?	Counterinsurgency,	Airpower,	and	Dynamic	
Targeting,”	Air	and	Space	Power	Journal,	Vol.	21,	No.	4,	2007	75-86.	
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accompanied	by	a	sustained	counterterrorism	campaign	that	engages	the	terrorist	
organization	at	all	levels	and	by	intelligence	operations	conducted	by	states	that	make	it	
harder	for	terrorist	organizations	to	plan	and	execute	lethal	terrorist	attacks.28	Given	the	
multi-faceted	nature	of	counterterrorism	campaigns,	it	is	difficult	to	assess	the	success	of	
just	one	strategy.	This	is	why	Patrick	Johnston	does	not	claim	causality	in	his	study,	but	
rather	just	makes	note	of	the	strong	correlation	between	leadership	removal	and	the	
reduction	of	terrorist	violence.29		
Bryan	Price	does	try	to	establish	causality	between	leadership	removal	and	
organizational	death,	but	in	doing	so,	he	creates	some	problematic	issues.	In	order	to	
obtain	statistically	significant	results,	Price	created	a	huge	sample	across	which	he	could	
measure	the	effectiveness	of	leadership	removal.	However,	to	make	his	sample	large	
enough	to	be	statistically	significant,	he	included	many	terrorist	organizations	that	had	
fewer	than	100	members	in	them	when	they	experienced	leadership	removal.30	An	
organization	with	fewer	than	100	members	would	receive	a	greater	than	1%	reduction	in	
overall	capacity	from	leadership	removal,	so	it	is	difficult	to	establish	whether	the	
organizational	death	that	occurred	afterwards	was	a	result	of	the	loss	of	a	charismatic	
leader	or	the	overall	reduction	in	capacity	of	the	terrorist	organization.		
Finally,	critics	argue	that	charismatic	leadership	theorists	are	wrong	in	their	
assumptions	about	how	common	and	important	charismatic	leaders	are	in	terrorist	
organizations.	While	supporters	of	charismatic	leadership	theory	argue	that	terrorist	
organizations	rely	on	charismatic	instead	of	transactional	leaders	to	preserve	their	secrecy,	
																																								 																					
28	Max	Abrahms	and	Jochen	Mierau,	“Leadership	Matters:	The	Effects	of	Targeted	Killing	on	
Militant	Group	Tactics,”	Terrorism	and	Political	Violence.	Vol.	29	No.	5	2017,	47-79	
29	Johnston,	“Does	Decapitation	Work?”	47.			
30	Price,	“Targeting	Top	Terrorists”	34.		
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critics	respond	with	empirical	cases	that	show	transactional	leadership	is	actually	quite	
common	within	terrorist	organizations.		
For	example,	when	the	United	States	assassinated	Osama	Bin	Laden,	they	uncovered	
thousands	of	internal	Al	Qaeda	documents	that	detailed	an	intricate	financial	system	that	
illustrated	that	Al	Qaeda	had	a	very	hierarchical	and	structured	center.31	There	were	
clearly	identifiable,	mid-level	transactional	leaders	and	there	were	clear	lines	of	succession.	
All	this	suggested	that	Al	Qaeda	was	not	overly	dependent	on	the	charismatic	authority	of	
Osama	Bin	Laden	to	maintain	its	operational	capacity.	Additionally,	some	terrorist	
organizations,	such	as	the	IRA	and	Hamas,	function	as	violent	wings	of	political	parties.	Not	
only	do	these	organizations	boast	many	lower	and	mid-level	transactional	leaders	that	help	
run	the	organizations,	but	the	authority	within	these	organizations	is	derived	not	from	the	
charisma	of	its	leaders,	but	from	strength	of	the	political	party’s	ideology.	This	suggests	
that	even	if	a	leader	of	one	of	these	organizations	is	removed,	the	ideological	authority	of	
the	organization	will	survive.	With	these	points,	critics	contend	that	the	charismatic	
leadership	theory’s	assumptions	are	fatally	flawed	and	an	alternative	outlook	on	leadership	
removal	is	needed.		
Organizational	Resilience	Theory	
Scholars	critical	of	the	charismatic	leadership	theory	and	the	effectiveness	of	
leadership	removal	at	reducing	the	operational	capacity	of	terrorist	organizations	use	
organizational	resilience	theory	to	argue	that	terrorist	organizations	can	easily	absorb	the	
loss	of	leader	without	suffering	a	blow	to	that	organization’s	operational	capacity.	The	
organizational	resilience	theory	takes	the	key	assumption	behind	the	charismatic	
																																								 																					
31	Jacob	Shapiro	The	Terrorist	Dilemma:	managing	violent	covert	organizations.	(Princeton	
University	Press	2013)	83-99.		
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leadership	theory	-	that	leaders	are	critically	important	to	a	terrorist	organization’s	
authority	-	and	directly	contradicts	it,	arguing	that	individual	leaders	are	not	important	to	
the	functioning	of	a	terrorist	organization.			
Organizational	resilience	theory	argues	that	the	level	of	institutionalization	present	
within	an	organization,	as	opposed	to	its	leaders,	is	what	determines	the	ability	of	an	
organization	to	function	effectively.	Institutionalization	strengthens	organizations	through	
several	channels.	First,	the	more	institutionalized	an	organization,	the	more	diverse	its	
resources	will	be.32	As	an	organization	becomes	more	bureaucratic,	specialized	branches	
carry	out	specific	tasks.	In	a	terrorist	organization,	this	might	look	like	having	a	branch	of	
the	organization	that	is	dedicated	to	bomb	making,	which	is	separate	from	the	group’s	
finance	branch.	A	more	bureaucratic	organization	is	also	more	likely	to	have	redundancies	
built	into	the	organization,	such	as	having	multiple	sources	financing,	which	make	the	
organization	more	durable.		
More	institutionalized	and	bureaucratized	organizations	will	also	be	more	resistant	
to	outside	shocks	because	of	their	clearly	defined	rules,	procedures,	and	lines	of	succession.	
With	an	established	process	to	follow,	institutionalized	organizations	can	prevent	the	
damaging	confusion	that	follows	a	disruption	to	the	organization	and	quickly	continue	to	
carry	out	its	objectives.33	A	leader	that	is	removed	from	an	institutionalized	organization	
will	quickly	be	replaced	without	a	leadership	struggle	that	is	damaging	to	the	organization.		
The	effectiveness	of	the	organizational	resilience	theory	is	easily	seen	in	the	most	
institutionalized	and	bureaucratic	institutions	that	are	dedicated	to	the	use	of	violence,	
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namely	military	units.	Military	units	routinely	suffer	leadership	removal,	yet	they	have	a	
tendency	to	handle	leadership	removal	very	well.	For	example,	the	average	battle	casualty	
rate	for	1st	Lieutenants	in	the	U.S.	Army	during	the	Second	World	War	was	105%.34	This	
meant	the	average	company,	a	military	unit	of	around	200	soldiers,	would	experience	one	
instance	of	leadership	removal	over	the	course	of	the	war.	The	battle	casualty	rate	for	2nd	
Lieutenants	was	nearly	twice	as	high	at	204%.35	Yet	despite	the	frequency	of	leadership	
removal	within	military	units	in	WWII,	the	United	States	Army	did	not	lose	operational	
capacity	and	continued	on	to	win	the	war.	
Even	total	devastation	of	the	leadership	in	military	units	does	not	have	to	lead	to	
organizational	collapse.	When	the	116th	Infantry	regiment	landed	on	Omaha	Beach,	all	of	its	
officers,	including	its	commanding	officer,	were	killed	or	wounded	within	the	first	hour	of	
combat.36	Yet	despite	this	tremendous	loss	of	leadership,	the	116th	Infantry	regiment	went	
on	to	secure	the	Omaha	beachhead	within	24-hours	and	continued	to	serve	as	an	effective	
frontline	force	throughout	the	French	campaign.37	Clearly	,the	loss	of	leadership	does	not	
prevent	military	organizations	from	accomplishing	strategic	objectives.		
Empirical	research	also	suggests	that	terrorist	organizations	also	have	enough	of	an	
institutional	structure	to	resist	the	effects	of	leadership	removal.	Jenna	Jordan	has,	one	of	
the	most	detailed	studies	on	leadership	removal.	She	examined	hundreds	of	cases	of	
terrorist	removal	and	she	found	that,	on	average,	leadership	removal	tends	to	be	
																																								 																					
34	Anne	Leland	and	Mari-Jana,	“American	War	and	Military	Operations	Casualties:	List	and	
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35	Leland	and	Jana,	“American	War	and	Military	Operations	Casualties:	List	and	Statistics,”	
2010.		
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counterproductive,	as	it	will	actually	increase	levels	of	violence.38	This	trend	was	
particularly	pronounced	among	the	older,	larger,	and	most	institutionalized	terrorist	
organizations.	This	led	Jenna	Jordan	to	conclude	that	leadership	removal	is	a	costly	and	
counterproductive	counterterrorism	strategy.39		
Multiple	scholars	have	replicated	these	results.	Aaron	Mannes	and	Lisa	Landon	both	
conducted	large	quantitative	studies	that	also	found	leadership	removal	to	have	a	
negligible	impact	on	terrorist	organizations.40	These	results	also	held	up	in	case	studies.	
Steven	David	found,	when	he	examined	the	unnamed	but	widely	acknowledged	program	by	
Israel	of	target	killing,	that	it	did	not	deter	terrorist	organizations.41	In	fact,	he	found	many	
instances	in	which	targeted	killing	actually	led	to	an	increase	in	the	lethality	of	the	terrorist	
organization.42	The	organizations	that	he	was	examining	were	all	firmly	established	with	a	
great	degree	of	institutionalization.	This	gave	the	organizations	the	capacity	to	step	up	
attacks,	even	while	Israel	targeted	their	leaders.		
In	the	face	of	an	institutionalized	terrorist	organization,	supporters	of	the	
organizational	resilience	theory	find	that	leadership	removal	is	simply	ineffective	at	
impairing	the	operational	capacity	of	the	terrorist	organization.	Through	this	perspective,	
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leadership	targeting	is	at	best	ineffective,	and	at	worst	counterproductive	to	
counterterrorism	goals.	
Critiques	of	Organizational	Resilience	Theory		
There	are	several	critiques	of	the	organizational	resilience	theory.	A	large	problem	
with	the	theory	for	its	detractors	is	that	it	treats	leaders	as	actors	with	no	real	agency	or	
influence	in	their	organization.	The	organizational	resilience	theory	treats	leaders	as	little	
more	than	replaceable	parts.	Empirically,	this	is	not	always	the	case.	When	Israel	
implemented	its	leadership-targeting	program,	it	quickly	brought	Hamas	to	the	negotiating	
table,	and	the	first	demand	of	Hamas	was	to	stop	the	leadership-targeting	program.43	
Clearly,	the	leaders	of	Hamas	changed	the	operational	strategy	of	their	organization	to	
adapt	to	the	threat	to	their	leadership.	This	is	an	outcome	that	the	organizational	resilience	
theory	fails	to	explain.		
Organizational	resilience	theory,	just	like	the	charismatic	leadership	theory,	also	has	
measurement	issues.	While	levels	of	institutionalization	are	certainly	easier	to	measure,	
through	the	presence	of	captured	financial	and	bureaucratic	documents	and	information	
received	through	interrogations,	than	charisma,	measurements	of	institutionalization	are	
often	based	on	faulty	assumptions.	For	example,	it	is	generally	assumed	that	old	and	large	
terrorist	organizations	have	to	be	highly	bureaucratic,	otherwise	they	would	not	have	
survived	so	long.44	Again,	this	is	not	always	the	case.	The	Shining	Path	in	Peru	had	
thousands	of	members	and	was	active	in	Peru	for	over	30	years,	yet	had	low	levels	of	
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institutionalization	around	its	central	leadership.45	Classifying	the	level	of	
institutionalization	of	a	terrorist	organization	based	on	age	and	size	alone	can	lead	to	faulty	
results.		
The	portrayal	of	terrorist	organizations	as	either	organizations	dependent	on	
charismatic	authority	or	organizational	resilience	in	their	structure	is	detrimental	to	
evaluating	the	effectiveness	of	leadership	removal.	Terrorist	organizations	are	not	
uniformly	organized.	Almost	all	terrorist	organizations	contain	both	charismatic	leaders	
and	institutional	structures	designed	to	increase	the	ability	of	that	organization	to	
withstand	counterterrorism	operations,	but	the	importance	and	structure	of	these	two	
variables	will	vary	across	terrorist	organizations.	This	means	from	a	theoretical	
perspective	that	evaluating	the	effectiveness	of	leadership	removal	should	not	be	explained	
as	a	binary	choice,	in	which	organizations	that	are	based	on	charismatic	authority	will	be	
greatly	affected	by	leadership	removal	and	organizations	with	high	levels	of	
institutionalization	will	not	be	significantly	affected.	Rather,	the	effectiveness	of	leadership	
removal	on	a	terrorist	organization	is	determined	by	how	these	two	variables	interact	with	
each	other.		
The	interaction	of	these	two	variables	can	be	seen	in	the	case	of	Al	Qaeda.	Al	Qaeda	
had	an	incredibly	charismatic	leader	in	Osama	Bin	Laden.	He	could	expertly	articulate	the	
vision	of	the	organization	and	he	had	a	large	impact	on	the	members	of	Al	Qaeda,	even	if	he	
had	never	personally	interacted	with	them.46	At	the	same	time	though,	Al	Qaeda	is	a	very	
institutionalized	group	at	its	core.	Captured	documents	reveal	that	Al	Qaeda	kept	detailed	
																																								 																					
45	Steven	Stern,	Shining	and	Other	Paths	War	and	Society	in	Peru	1980-1995.	(Duke	
University	Press	1998),	267-301.		
46	Price,	“Targeting	Top	Terrorists”	45.	
	 20	
financial	records	that	included	a	payroll	system,	and	also	collected	demographic	
information	on	its	recruits,	and	would	even	provide	social	services	and	benefits	to	the	
families	of	it	recruits.47	The	existence	of	both	charismatic	authority	and	high	levels	of	
institutionalization	in	one	terrorist	organization	challenges	the	classical	theoretical	
understanding	of	leadership	removal.			
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Chapter II 
	
Methods	and	Research	Design	
In	order	to	determine	how	charismatic	authority	and	institutionalization	interact	
within	a	terrorist	organization	to	impact	the	effectiveness	of	leadership	removal,	this	thesis	
is	constructed	as	a	typology.	I	examine	leadership	removal	in	four	terrorist	organizations,	
Aum	Shinrikyo,	Hamas,	the	PKK,	and	Al	Qaeda.		
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	 These	four	terrorist	groups	provide	valuable	case	studies	through	which	I	examine	
how	charismatic	authority	and	institutionalization	interact	within	a	terrorist	organization.	
The	cases	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	and	Hamas	were	chosen	to	test	the	traditional	theoretical	
thought	on	leadership	removal.	As	an	organization	with	high	charismatic	authority	and	low	
levels	of	institutionalization,	Aum	Shinrikyo	should	be	severely	degraded	by	leadership	
removal.	Hamas,	on	the	other	hand,	as	an	organization	with	low	levels	of	charismatic	
authority	but	high	levels	of	institutionalization,	should	prove	resilient	to	leadership	
removal.	The	cases	of	Al	Qaeda	and	the	PKK	are	the	most	important	to	this	thesis,	as	they	
shed	the	most	light	on	how	charismatic	authority	and	institutionalization	influence	the	
effects	of	leadership	removal.	In	these	organizations,	the	two	classical	theoretical	
frameworks	reach	opposite	conclusions	about	what	the	effects	of	leadership	removal	
would	be.	Since	there	is	a	high	amount	of	charismatic	authority	within	Al	Qaeda	and	the	
PKK,	charismatic	leadership	theory	would	suggest	leadership	removal	would	be	effective	at	
reducing	the	operational	capacity	of	terrorist	organizations,	whereas	since	both	
organizations	also	have	high	levels	of	institutionalization,	organizational	resilience	theory	
would	suggest	that	their	operational	capacity	would	not	be	hindered	by	leadership	
removal.		
	 I	have	not	included	any	organizations	with	both	low	levels	of	charismatic	authority	
and	institutionalization	because	they	are	extremely	rare.	While	terrorist	organizations	can	
have	both	high	levels	of	charismatic	authority	and	institutionalization,	they	generally	need	
at	least	one	of	them	to	function.	An	organization	without	a	consolidated	charismatic	
authority	or	a	strong	institutional	structure	would	have	no	way	to	bind	its	members	
together	and	exert	authority	over	them.	Even	if	a	terrorist	organization	managed	to	
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function	in	a	low	institutionalization	and	charismatic	authority	setting,	choosing	to	
examine	it	to	learn	about	the	effects	of	leadership	removal	on	a	terrorist	organization’s	
operational	capacity	would	be	pointless	since	leaders	in	that	group	would	not	be	important	
to	the	organization’s	functions.		
One	final	important	note	about	the	terrorist	organizations	examined	in	this	thesis	is	
they	are	all	large	organizations.	Each	one	of	these	organizations	had,	at	the	peak	of	its	
power,	over	10,000	members.	I	chose	to	examine	large	organizations	for	three	reasons.	
First,	size	is	an	important	factor	in	determining	the	risk	posed	by	a	terrorist	organization.	
While	smaller	groups	can	certainly	cause	havoc	and	conduct	devastating	attacks,	larger	
group	will	pose	more	of	a	threat	to	a	state	due	to	the	increase	capacity	that	comes	with	a	
larger	number	of	individuals.		This	makes	the	conclusions	regarding	the	effectiveness	of	
leadership	removal	on	the	operational	capacity	of	terrorist	organizations	more	valuable	in	
since	governments	and	citizens	have	more	to	fear	from	large	terrorist	organizations.		
Secondly,	the	inclusion	of	large	terrorist	groups	allows	this	thesis	to	measure	how	
organizational	resilience	theory	and	charismatic	leadership	theory	interact	within	an	
organization.	As	previously	mentioned,	terrorist	organizations	typically	have	both	
significant	levels	of	institutionalization	and	a	charismatic	leader	and	one	of	the	goals	of	this	
thesis	is	to	determine	how	these	two	factors	interact	within	an	organization.	However,	
smaller	terrorist	organizations	can	lack	the	high	levels	of	institutionalization	on	which	
organizational	resilience	theory	is	based.	For	example,	Louis	Beam,	the	somewhat	
charismatic	head	of	a	small	far-right	white	supremacy	group	within	the	United	States,	has	
no	institutional	structure	to	his	organization.	Instead,	he	tries	to	use	charismatic	appeals	to	
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get	others	to	conduct	violence	in	the	name	of	his	goals.48	While	his	case	is	somewhat	
unique,	his	location,	unlike	that	of	most	self-anointed	leaders	of	terrorist	groups,	is	known	
to	the	authorities	of	the	state	that	he	is	trying	to	undermine	through	terrorism.	This	
illustrates	the	point	that	smaller	terrorist	organizations	don’t	need,	and	won’t	always	have	
,an	institutional	structure.	While	large	terrorist	organizations	can	also	have	lower	levels	of	
institutionalization	-	the	Shining	Path,	for	example,	has	low	levels	of	institutionalization,	
albeit	in	the	center,	with	the	outer	fringes	of	the	organization	being	much	more	structured	
–	large	organizations	with	to	over	10,000	members	require	some	sort	of	functioning	
bureaucracy	so	the	two	variables	will	always	interact.49	Studying	the	effects	of	leadership	
removal	on	small	terrorist	organizations	does	not	yield	as	many	interesting	insights,	as	
both	charismatic	leadership	and	organization	resilience	theorist	would	agree	that	
leadership	removal	in	the	case	of	these	organizations	would	lead	to	organizational	death.50		
Finally,	this	thesis	looks	only	at	large	terrorist	organizations	to	help	isolate	the	
effectiveness	of	leadership	removal.	There	are	many	quantitative	studies	that	find	that	
leadership	removal	is	a	particularly	effective	strategy	against	smaller	terrorist	
organizations.	Even	Jenna	Jordan,	an	avowed	critic	of	the	strategy,	notes	in	her	quantitative	
work	that	leadership	removal	is	remarkably	effective	against	small	and	newly	established	
terrorist	organizations.51	However,	many	of	the	organizations	that	these	quantitative	
studies	find	leadership	removal	to	be	effective	against	are	so	small	that	it	is	hard	to	
attribute	the	aftermath	of	leadership	removal	simply	to	the	loss	of	leadership.		As	
																																								 																					
48	Shapiro,	The	Terrorist’s	Dilemma:	Managing	Violent	Covert	Organizations,	2013	11-32	
49	Steven	Stern,	Shining	and	Other	Paths	War	and	Society	in	Peru	1980-1995,	1998	
50	Price,	“Targeting	Top	Terrorists”	43-44.	And	Jenna	Jordan.	“When	Heads	Roll”.	743-745	
51	Jenna	Jordan.	“When	Heads	Roll”	743-745.	
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mentioned	earlier,	many	of	these	organizations	have	less	than	100	members.52	In	these	
cases,	the	loss	of	a	leader	not	only	means	the	loss	of	a	charismatic	and	guiding	figure	for	the	
organization	but	also	the	loss	of	over	1%	of	the	organization’s	manpower.	In	these	cases,	it	
is	exceptionally	hard	to	use	mathematical	tools	to	isolate	the	effects	of	the	loss	of	
leadership.	
Determining	Leaders	
	 The	prerequisite	to	studying	the	effects	of	leadership	removal	is	determining	who	
the	leaders	of	terrorist	organizations	are.	Many	studies	in	the	field	of	leadership	removal	
use	an	expansive	definition	of	leader	that	includes	everything	from	operational	
commanders	to	chief	bomb	makers.	This	thesis	takes	the	opposite	approach.	In	this	thesis,	
the	leader	of	a	terrorist	organization	is	the	head	political	authority	within	the	organization.	
Determining	who	the	leader	of	the	terrorist	organizations	in	this	thesis	was	quite	easy.	
They	were	all	founders	or	co-founders	of	their	respective	organizations,	held	complete	
authority	within	their	organization,	and	were	solely	responsible	for	their	organizations	
overall	agenda	and	strategy.		
Defining	Terms	
Terrorist	Organization:	With	acknowledgement	to	the	fact	that	one	person’s	
terrorist	is	another’s	freedom	fighter,	I	have	included	these	groups	as	terrorist	
organizations	based	on	the	following	definition	of	a	terrorist	organization:	non-state	
organizations	that	employ	violence	against	civilians	in	pursuit	of	goals	that	are	religious,	
political,	or	ideological	in	nature.	All	of	the	previously	mentioned	groups,	however	laudable	
one	may	consider	their	ultimate	objectives	to	be,	have	undertaken	actions	that	make	them	
																																								 																					
52	See	datasets	in	Jenna	Jordan,	“When	Heads	Roll”	143-145,	and	Price,	“Targeting	Top	
Terrorists,”	34.		
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fall	into	this	category.	All	find	themselves	on	the	U.S.	Department	of	State’s	list	of	terrorist	
organizations	but	their	inclusion	in	this	thesis	is	not	an	attempt	to	pass	a	moral	judgment	
on	them,	but	an	acknowledgement	of	their	actions.53				
	 Terrorist	Attack:	I	define	a	terrorist	attack	as	the	use	of	violence	by	a	terrorist	
organization	to	further	its	political	agenda.	The	parameters	of	this	definition	mean	that	
attacks	undertaken	by	terrorist	groups	that	target	what	under	normal	wartime	
circumstances	would	be	considered	legitimate	targets	such	as	military	units,	are	classified	
as	terrorist	attacks.	I	am	using	this	looser	definition	of	a	terrorist	attack,	as	opposed	to	one	
that	only	classifies	attacks	that	directly	target	civilians	as	a	terrorist	attack	because	I	feel	
that	this	definition	provides	a	better	understanding	of	the	operational	capacity	of	a	
terrorist	organization.		
Measuring	Charismatic	Authority	Within	an	Organization	
	 In	order	to	determine	how	important	charismatic	authority	was	within	a	terrorist	
group,	I	used	David	Hoffman	fourteen-point	measurement	of	charismatic	authority.54	This	
scale	and	the	justifications	for	the	leaders	examined	in	this	thesis	can	be	viewed	in	the	
Appendix,	where	I	apply	Hoffman’s	scale	to	the	leaders	examined	in	this	thesis.		
Measuring	Institutionalization	
	 To	determine	levels	of	institutionalizations	within	terrorist	organizations,	I	rely	
heavily	on	the	information	from	captured	internal	documents.	These	records	do	a	good	job	
in	explaining	to	what	extent	there	was	an	organized	bureaucratic	structure	in	place	and	
what	that	structure	looked	like.	Paper	trails	are	also	a	good	indication	of	
																																								 																					
53	U.S.	Department	of	State.	“Foreign	Terrorist	Organizations”	
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm		
54	Hoffman,	“Quantifying	and	Qualifying	Charisma,”	716.		
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institutionalization.	Generally	speaking,	the	more	documents	and	records	an	organization	
keeps	the	more	institutionalized	that	organization	is.	Some	other	factors	that	are	important	
to	determining	levels	of	institutionalization	are	the	amount	of	linkages	within	an	
organization.	Extensive	linkages	within	an	organization	are	key	to	building	
institutionalized	structures	as	it	ensures	communication	between	members	and	provides	
clarity	about	the	structure	of	the	organization.	Finally,	to	be	highly	institutionalized,	a	
terrorist	organization	needs	to	be	able	to	use	its	structure	in	secret.	Terrorist	organizations	
need	to	be	secretive	because	a	public	institutional	framework	would	not	serve	their	goals.	
A	highly	institutionalized	terrorist	organization	not	only	has	an	organized	institutional	
structure	but	is	also	able	to	operate	that	structure	in	secret.	A	more	comprehensive	list	of	
ten	major	criteria	I	use	in	evaluating	the	level	of	institutionalization	within	a	terrorist	
organization	can	be	found	in	the	Appendix.		
Measuring	the	Dependent	Variable	
	 The	dependent	variable	in	this	thesis	is	operational	capacity.	The	operational	
capacity	of	a	terrorist	organization	is	its	ability	to	use	political	violence.	In	order	to	
measure	operational	capacity	I	have	broken	it	down	into	a	series	of	indicator	variables:	
number	of	attacks,	lethality,	wounded,	type	of	attack,	and	location	and	target	of	attack.		
1. Number	of	attacks:	This	is	an	important	indicator	in	determining	the	operational	
capacity	of	a	terrorist	organization	because	the	number	of	attacks	is	informative	of	
how	active	a	terrorist	organization	is.	Terrorist	organizations	accomplish	their	
political	goals	through	the	use	of	violent	attacks	so	the	ability	for	a	terrorist	
organization	to	launch	violent	attacks	is	key	to	its	operational	capacity.		
	 28	
2. Lethality:	Not	only	is	the	number	of	attacks	important	but	also	how	lethal	those	
attacks	are.	This	indicator	can	pick	up	smaller	changes	in	operational	capacity	than	
simply	the	number	of	attacks.	For	example,	if	the	number	of	attacks	after	leadership	
removal	stays	the	same	but	the	lethality	of	those	attacks	falls,	it	could	indicate	that	
leadership	removal	disrupted	the	ability	of	the	terrorist	organization	to	orchestrate	
successful	terrorist	attacks,	which	would	be	a	decrease	in	the	organization’s	
operational	capacity.		
3. Wounded:	The	main	tool	of	a	terrorist	organization	is	fear	and	attacks	don’t	need	to	
be	lethal	to	instill	fear	in	a	target	population.	The	amount	of	people	wounded	by	
terrorist	attacks	helps	a	terrorist	organization	accomplish	its	political	goals	so	
should	be	considered	part	of	a	terrorist	organization’s	operational	capacity.		
4. Type	of	Attack:	The	type	of	attack	is	informative	of	the	operational	capacity	of	
terrorist	organizations.	Bombing	attacks	take	considerable	more	planning	and	
leadership	than	stabbings	so	a	change	in	a	terrorist	organization’s	repertoire	of	
violence	could	signal	a	change	in	its	operational	capacity.		
5. Location	and	Target	of	Attack:	Attacks	that	take	place	further	away	from	a	
terrorist	organization’s	central	leadership	also	take	considerably	more	planning	and	
leadership	then	local	attacks.	The	targets	of	these	attacks	are	also	important.	Rre	
terrorist	organizations	attacking	soft	targets	like	markets	or	public	or	hard	targets	
such	as	military	units	or	diplomatic	missions?	A	change	in	these	indicators	
represents	a	change	to	the	organization’s	operational	capacity.		
All	of	the	data	on	the	indicator	variables	was	taken	from	the	University	of	Maryland’s	
Global	Terrorism	Database	(GTD).	Which	was	created	and	maintained	through	the	National	
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Consortium	for	the	Study	of	Terrorism	and	Response	to	Terrorism	(START).	All	of	the	data	
within	the	GTD	is	complied	and	coded	from	public	unclassified	documents.		
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Chapter III 
	
Aum	Shinrikyo	
The	case	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	clearly	illustrates	how	terrorist	groups	structured	
around	charismatic	authority,	but	without	a	strong	institutional	structure	to	support	them,	
will	have	their	operational	capacity	damaged	by	leadership	removal.	Without	a	clear	
institutional	structure	in	place,	Aum	Shinrikyo	was	unable	to	adapt	to	the	shock	of	
leadership	removal,	and	the	organization	quickly	crumbled.		
Background	
On	March	20th,	1995,	five	men	boarded	five	separate	subway	trains	on	the	Tokyo	
underground.55	Each	of	the	men	carried	two	seemingly	normal	items,	an	umbrella	with	a	
pointed	top	and	a	bundle	of	newspapers.56	Half	an	hour	later,	the	trains	converged	at	the	
Kasumigaseki	station	in	the	heart	of	Japan’s	government	district.	As	the	five	men	left	their	
respective	trains,	they	put	their	newspapers	on	the	floor	and	drove	their	umbrellas	through	
them.57	Hidden	underneath	the	newspapers	were	plastic	vials	of	Sarin	gas,	a	chemical	
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56	Mark	Juergensmeyer,	Terror	in	the	Mind	of	God.	(University	of	California	Press:	2003)	
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103-104.	
	 31	
compound	so	dangerous	that	droplet	the	size	of	a	pinhead	can	kill	an	adult.58	At	first	no	one	
realized	anything	was	wrong,	but	after	a	few	minutes	people	on	the	trains	started	feeling	
nauseous	and	then	started	having	seizures	and	began	foaming	at	the	mouth.59	By	the	time	
the	conductors	of	the	trains	finally	realized	that	something	was	very	wrong,	stopped	at	the	
nearest	stations,	and	called	emergency	personnel	to	treat	the	victims,	a	massive	amount	of	
damage	had	already	been	inflicted.	Twelve	people	were	killed	in	that	attack	and	another		
5,500	suffered	some	kind	of	injury	from	the	gas.	Many	of	the	wounded	would	never	fully	
recover.60	It	was	the	worst	terrorist	attack	in	Japanese	history,	and	it	is	still	the	most	
devastating	instance	of	a	weapon	of	mass	destruction	being	used	by	a	non-state	actor.61	
The	perpetrators	of	the	terrorist	attack	all	belonged	to	a	cult-like	religion	called	
Aum	Shinrikyo.	Aum	Shinrikyo	was	founded	by	Chizuo	Matsumoto,	who	,after	its	founding	
changed	his	name	to	Shoko	Asahara	to	better	fit	his	title	of	guru,	because,	during	a	trip	to	
India,	he	claimed	he	received	a	message	from	the	deity	Shiva	and	a	special	mission	from	the	
Dalai	Lama	himself.62	Shoko	Asahara	was	very	skilled	in	understanding	the	spiritual	needs	
of	individuals	and	he	created	Aum	Shinrikyo	to	be	particularly	attractive	to	young	people.	
The	religion	incorporated	manga	and	anime,	which	were	not	only	attractive	to	a	young	
audience	but	also	were	extremely	ingrained	in	Japanese	secular	culture.63	The	main	
message	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	was	quite	simple	-	modern	life	is	an	endless	grind,	but	through	
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the	teaching	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	one	could	both	have	fun	and	obtain	enlightenment.64	This	
message	was	so	attractive	that	by	1995,	Aum	Shinrikyo	had	over	40,000	members	and	its	
own	commune	in	Japan.65		
While	the	cult	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	started	out	as	a	nonviolent	organization,	Shoko	
Asahara	slowly	adjusted	its	goals,	making	them	more	extreme	until	the	attack	in	March	of	
1995.	In	1989,	Shoko	Asahara	introduced	the	Tibetan	Buddhist	idea	of	poa,	the	sacred	
killing	in	the	name	of	the	spiritual	leader,	into	Aum	Shinrikyo.66	The	organization	also	
adopted	more	apocalyptic	beliefs.	Aum	Shinrikyo,	like	some	sects	of	Christianity,	taught	
that	Armageddon	was	fast	approaching	and	when	it	occurred,	only	members	of	Aum	
Shinrikyo	who	had	reached	enlightenment	would	be	saved	from	its	destruction.67	Shoko	
Asahara	tried	to	use	this	message	to	gain	political	power	when	Aum	Shinrikyo	formed	its	
own	political	party,	but	after	it	failed	to	gain	enough	votes	to	join	the	Japanese	parliament,	
Shoko	Asahara	was	no	longer	content	on	waiting	for	the	apocalypse	to	end	society.	The	
new	goal	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	was	the	absolute	destruction	of	Japanese	society.68		
Aum	Shinrikyo	posed	a	unique	challenge	to	Japanese	security.	The	perpetrators	of	
the	Sarin	gas	attack	were	all	very	highly	educated,	having	attended	some	of	Japan’s	finest	
universities.69	Furthermore,	the	possession	of	Sarin	gas	showed	that	Aum	Shinrikyo	had	
the	capacity	to	inflict	damage	that	most	terrorist	organization	could	only	dream	of	and	the	
large	numbers	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	members	dispersed	in	the	Japanese	population	at	large	
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made	it	almost	impossible	to	stop	future	attacks.70	Given	the	security	challenges	posed	by	
Aum	Shinrikyo,	it	would	have	been	understandable	for	the	Japanese	government	to	have	
adopted	authoritarian	and	undemocratic	counterterrorism	policies	towards	the	entire	
organization.	However,	the	Japanese	government	instead	focused	exclusively	on	holding	
the	leaders	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	responsible	for	the	attack,	not	the	organization	as	a	whole.71	
While	the	government	did	repeal	its	status	as	a	religious	organization,	they	did	not	ban	the	
organization.72	Instead,	the	Japanese	government	put	its	efforts	into	capturing	Shoko	
Asahara,	which	it	did	about	a	year	after	the	attack.		
Charismatic	Authority	Within	Aum	Shinrikyo	
The	role	of	Shoko	Asahara	in	Aum	Shinrikyo	upholds	the	ideas	of	the	charismatic	
leadership	theory.	Shoko	Asahara	was	completely	blind	in	one	eye	and	partially	blind	in	the	
other.73	As	a	child,	he	had	been	sent	to	a	school	for	the	blind,	where	his	partial	vision	gave	
him	an	advantage	over	his	peers	and	made	him	a	natural	leader.	He	built	his	leadership	
skill	as	a	child	using	his	gift	of	limited	vision	to	manipulate	his	classmates.74	Later,	as	head	
of	Aum	Shinrikyo,	Shoko	Asahara	incorporated	his	blindness	into	his	cult	of	personality.		
Shoko	Asahara	had	an	unbelievable	level	of	authority	over	the	members	of	Aum	
Shinrikyo.	Many	ex-members	cited	him	as	the	main	draw	of	the	organization	and	he	had	a	
profound	impact	on	the	people	he	met.	One	ex-member	was	shocked	when	he	met	Shoko	
Asahara	by	how	knowledgeable	and	profound	he	was.	75He	spoke	with	such	firm	authority.	
It	felt	like	from	just	one	short	interaction,	Shoko	Asahara	could	judge	a	man’s	worth	and	
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value.76	Shoko	Asahara	built	up	these	feeling	by	claiming	that	he	was	not	an	ordinary	man.	
Building	on	Hindu	theories	of	existence,	Shoko	Asahara	claimed	that	he	occupied	a	higher	
plane	of	existence	than	that	of	an	ordinary	man,	which	allowed	him	to	see,	in	spite	of	his	
blindness,	the	course	of	future	events.77	Given	that	many	of	the	members	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	
are	on	record	saying	that	they	thought	that	the	capture	of	Shoko	Asahara	by	the	Japanese	
authorities	was	planned	by	Shoko	Asahara	himself	as	a	strategic	response	to	events	that	
would	occur	in	the	future,	it	appears	that	the	rank	and	file	truly	bought	into	the	cult	of	
personality	surrounding	Shoko	Asahara.78	It	is	abundantly	clear	that	charismatic	authority	
was	very	important	in	Aum	Shinrikyo.		
Shoko	Asahara	also	worked	to	structure	the	practices	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	in	a	way	to	
help	enhance	his	charismatic	authority.	This	can	be	seen	in	the	recruitment	and	initiation	
process	of	the	organization.	All	of	Aum	Shinrikyo’s	advertising	publications	heavily	
featured	Shoko	Asahara	and	his	spiritual	wisdom.79	The	goal	of	the	recruitment	process	
was	to	attract	people	who	already	felt	close	to	Shoko	Asahara,	as	opposed	to	the	
organization	at	large.	This	was	even	more	dramatically	reinforced	during	the	initiation	
process.		
The	initiation	process	was	a	tool	used	to	cement	Shoko	Asahara’s	authority	within	
the	organization.	After	an	individual	would	apply	to	be	admitted	into	Aum	Shinrikyo	and	
had	passed	vetting	and	submitted	their	10,000	yen	fee,	they	were	invited	to	Aum	
Shinrikyo’s	initiation	process.80	This	process	usually	involved	being	forced	to	sit	in	a	dark	
																																								 																					
76	Ibid,	108.	
77	Ibid,	115.		
78	Ibid	,	115-116.		
79	Ibid,	108.		
80	Juergensmeyer,	Terror	in	the	Mind	of	God,	107.	
	 35	
room	wearing	nothing	but	a	diaper	and	not	being	allowed	to	eat	or	move	without	being	
told	to	do	so.	81	After	this	was	over,	each	recruit	would	get	to	meet	with	Shoko	Asahara.	He	
would	interact	with	the	recruits	and	ask	them	questions	about	their	lives	and	what	they	
sought.	After	this	brief	interaction,	the	recruits	would	be	placed	on	lightly	vibrating	mats	
and	be	given	a	tea	that	caused	them	to	hallucinate	(It	is	suspected	that	the	tea	was	laced	
with	LSD).82	During	this	hallucination	the	recruits	were	told	to	think	of	Shoko	Asahara	
because	only	through	him	could	they	avoid	bad	visions	and	find	the	truth.83	While	this	
ritual	is	admittedly	bizarre,	it	was	incredibly	effective	in	creating	a	personal	devotion	
among	each	recruit	to	Shoko	Asahara.	This	was	an	organization	entirely	built	around	the	
premise	that	Shoko	Asahara	was	the	absolute	authority.	No	other	leader	within	the	
organization	was	elevated	anywhere	close	to	his	level,	so	even	though	there	was	an	
organization	behind	Shoko	Asahara,	it	was	designed	so	that	only	he	could	lead	the	
organization.		
Institutionalization	in	Aum	Shinrikyo	
While	Aum	Shinrikyo	lacked	a	strong	organizational	structure,	because	it	was	a	very	
large	organization,	it	did	have	some	institutional	structures	in	place	that	could	have	
mitigated	the	effects	of	leadership	removal.	The	public	face	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	appeared	to	
be	very	structured.	Aum	Shinrikyo	had	a	downtown	Tokyo	office	with	positions	that	
included	head	of	public	relations,	general	secretary,	and	official	spokesperson.84	The	
organization	had	a	media	wing	that	created	its	own	publications,	films,	and	owned	
bookstores	to	raise	revenue	for	the	wider	organization.	The	organization	also	had	a	list	of	
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every	member	and	every	member	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	was	required	to	pay	the	organization	
10,000	yen	(around	$100)	a	month.85	Underneath	this	public	organization	structure	was	
another	secret	one	that	included	a	highly	advanced	chemical	weapons	manufacturing	plant	
at	the	Aum	Shinrikyo	compound.86	This	organizational	structure	was	supported	by	the	
codified	belief	system	of	Aum	Shinrikyo.			
The	belief	system	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	also	supported	the	organization	because	it	
established	norms	within	the	group	and	provided	an	alternative	source	of	authority	within	
the	organization.	The	beliefs	and	practices	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	provided	a	common	structure	
to	the	organization	that	would	remain	unchanged	during	leadership	removal.	Additionally,	
this	belief	system	also	opened	up	an	alternative	source	of	authority	within	Aum	Shinrikyo.	
Charismatic	leaders	are	so	important	to	terrorist	organizations	because	their	connection	
with	their	members	changes	an	individual’s	rational	framework,	allowing	them	to	engage	
in	actions	that	do	not	appear	to	be	rational	from	an	individual	standpoint,	such	as	suicide	
bombing,	but	are	incredibly	useful	to	terrorist	organizations.87	However,	this	authority	
does	not	always	have	to	come	from	an	individual.	Religion	can	also	change	an	individual’s	
pre-rational	framework.	Indeed,	Jenna	Jordan	argues	that	Islamic	terrorist	organizations	
will	not	suffer	from	leadership	removal	because	religion	can	provide	the	authority	
necessary	to	run	the	organization	entirely	independently	of	its	leaders.88	While	Aum	
Shinrikyo	certainly	is	not	a	traditional	religion,	its	belief	system	could	have	provided	an	
alternative	source	of	authority.		
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Yet,	despite	having	the	trappings	of	a	well-structured	organization,	Aum	Shinrikyo	
lacked	the	organizational	infrastructure	to	allow	it	to	successfully	withstand	a	concerted	
counterterrorism	effort.	All	of	the	previously	mentioned	institutional	structures	of	Aum	
Shinrikyo	were	part	of	its	public	organization.	For	a	terrorist	group	to	be	highly	
institutionalized,	it	is	essential	for	them	to	build	what	is	referred	to	as	a	dark	organization.	
These	are	organizational	structures	that	can	be	run	in	secret.	On	this	account,	Aum	
Shinrikyo	utterly	failed.	Its	terrorist	activities	were	secret	from	a	large	part	of	the	
organization,	with	only	the	central	leadership	conceiving	and	planning	operations.89	There	
were	also	poor	linkages	between	different	parts	of	Aum	Shinrikyo.	The	group	had	several	
campuses	with	local	leaders,	but	these	leaders	did	not	interact	with	each	other	and	
received	all	their	instructions	from	the	central	leadership.90	This	structure	left	Aum	
Shinrikyo	in	a	poor	position	to	rely	exclusively	on	its	organizational	structure	to	support	its	
terrorist	activities.		
Impact	of	Leadership	Removal	
The	removal	of	Shoko	Asahara	from	the	head	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	ended	the	
organization’s	ability	to	function	as	an	effective	terrorist	organization.	This	can	easily	be	
seen	by	examining	the	group’s	terrorist	attacks.	While	Aum	Shinrikyo	was	not	a	terrorist	
organization	that	had	attacked	the	Japanese	state	very	often	before	1995	(see	table	1),	their	
attack	had	been	surprising	lethal.	The	year	before	their	infamous	subway	attack,	the	group	
launched	a	terrorist	attack	that	left	over	500	casualties.91	They	also	continued	to	attack	the	
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Japanese	state	after	the	Sarin	gas	attacks	with	smaller	terrorist	attacks	that	targeted	
government	and	law	enforcement	officials.92	The	ramping	up	of	Aum	Shinrikyo’s	attacks	
came	to	an	abrupt	end	around	the	same	time	that	Shoko	Asahara	was	captured	by	Japanese	
authorities.	After	his	capture,	the	group	did	not	launch	a	single	attack.93	
Terrorist	Activity	of	Aum	Shinrikyo94		
Year	 #	of	attacks		 #	of	deaths		 #	of	wounded	
1993	 0	 0	 0	
1994	 1	 7	 500	
1995	 6	 14	 5,503	
1996	 0	 0	 0	
1997	 0	 0	 0	
1998	 0	 0	 0	
Table	1	
The	loss	of	Shoko	Asahara	also	had	a	devastating	impact	on	Aum	Shinrikyo’s	
capacity	and	leadership	as	well.	Aum	Shinrikyo	quickly	lost	thousands	of	its	members	after	
Shoko	Asahara	was	arrested.95	Without	the	guidance	and	leadership	provided	by	Shoko	
Asahara,	the	organization	quickly	folded	in	on	itself.		
The	existence	of	both	a	Aum	Shinrikyo’s	public	organizational	structure	and	its	
religious	ideology	did	not	prevent	the	group	from	being	fatally	damaged	by	leadership	
removal.	This	has	to	do	with	the	structure	of	the	organization	and	the	conditions	in	which	it	
operated.	The	lack	of	a	dark	organizational	structure	prevented	the	local	leaders	of	Aum	
Shinrikyo	from	understanding	what	was	happening	in	the	different	parts	of	the	
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organization	or	coordinating	any	of	their	actions.	The	reliance	on	the	central	leadership	for	
information,	and	the	secrecy	of	the	central	leadership,	also	severely	handicapped	Aum	
Shinrikyo’s	efforts	to	respond	to	leadership	removal.	Some	members	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	
refused	to	believe	that	the	organization	was	responsible	for	the	sarin	gas	attack.	Other	
leaders	believed	that	Shoko	Asaraha	actually	wanted	to	be	arrested	because	he	knew	of	
some	coming	event	that	they	did	not,	so	they	continued	to	wait	for	orders	from	the	central	
leadership	that	never	came.96		
Conditions	within	Japanese	society	also	ensured	that	the	Aum	Shinrikyo	“religion”	
was	not	enough	of	a	source	of	authority	to	allow	other	leaders	to	replace	Shoko	Asahara.	
Despite	popular	perceptions,	religion	is	not	naturally	politically	salient	to	individuals.97	It	is	
made	politically	salient	through	political	institutions.	For	example,	one	of	the	reasons	
religion	is	prominent	in	conflicts	in	the	Middle	East	is	that	postcolonial	societies	
redistributed	goods	along	religious	lines.	This	makes	religion	incredibly	important	to	an	
individual’s	life	chances.	This	creates	an	opportunity	for	political	entrepreneurs	to	use	
religion	as	a	basis	to	mobilize	people.98	Since	religion	is	already	politically	salient	in	these	
societies,	the	political	entrepreneurs	don’t	need	to	be	particularly	skilled	or	charismatic	to	
organize	along	religious	lines.	This	was	not	the	case	for	Aum	Shinrikyo.		
Aum	Shinrikyo	was	not	made	politically	salient	by	the	conditions	of	Japanese	
society.	Political	distribution	and	equal	access	were	not	affected	by	an	individual’s	religion.	
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Aum	Shinrikyo	had	equal	status	under	Japanese	law	as	any	other	religion	and	its	
classification	as	a	religion	gave	it	advantages.99The	lack	of	natural	grievances	against	the	
Japanese	state	made	it	difficult	to	mobilize	members	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	against	the	Japanese	
state.	It	took	the	uniquely	extraordinary	skill	and	charisma	of	Shoko	Asahara	to	mobilize	its	
members.	The	loss	of	that	talent	was	simply	irreplaceable.		
There	are	a	couple	of	lessons	on	when	leadership	removal	will	be	effective	that	can	
be	drawn	from	the	Aum	Shinrikyo	case.	First,	the	existence	of	institutionalization	by	itself	is	
not	enough	on	its	own	to	reduce	the	vulnerability	of	a	terrorist	organization	to	leadership	
removal.	What	matters	is	how	the	institutions	within	a	terrorist	organization	support	the	
goals	of	that	organization.	Terrorist	organizations	can	be	built	either	to	increase	the	
survivability	of	the	organization	or	to	increase	the	control	of	its	leader	over	the	
organization	as	a	whole.	As	the	Aum	Shinrikyo	case	shows,	organizations	that	try	to	
prioritize	control	will	be	much	more	susceptible	to	leadership	removal.		
Unfortunately,	terrorist	organizations	are	not	transparent	about	whether	they	build	
their	organization	to	resist	leadership	removal	or	increase	the	control	of	the	leader	over	
the	organization.	There	are	clues	that	can	help	in	determining	this,	though.	Nearly	every	
former	member	of	Aum	Shinrikyo,	when	asked	about	their	experience	in	the	organization	
and	their	motivations	for	joining,	mentioned	Shoko	Asahara.100	The	ubiquity	of	Shoko	
Asahara	in	the	common	recruit’s	experience	shows	that	the	structure	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	was	
designed	to	promote	the	leader.	Finding	out	the	motivations	of	individuals	in	joining	an	
organization	can	provide	a	useful	measuring	stick	in	determining	how	important	an	
individual	leader	is	to	the	overall	organization.	
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Another	important	conclusion	from	the	Aum	Shinrikyo	case	is	that	ideology	is	not	
always	enough	to	provide	the	authority	necessary	to	run	a	terrorist	organization.	Without	
factors	that	promote	the	political	salience	of	religion,	terrorist	organizations	will	rely	more	
heavily	on	authority	from	charismatic	figures	than	authority	derived	from	an	ideology.	
There	are	two	important	implications	from	this.	The	first	is	that	leadership	removal	should	
not	be	discounted	as	a	tactic	against	terrorist	organizations	that	are	religious	or	
ideologically	driven.	Instead,	each	terrorist	organization’s	ideology	needs	to	be	evaluated	
within	the	conditions	it	operates.		
The	second,	and	more	important,	implication	from	the	Aum	Shinrikyo	case	is	that	
liberal	democracies	should	try	to	avoid	making	ideology	or	religion	politically	salient	in	
their	counterterrorism	operations.	One	of	the	best	tactics	of	the	Japanese	government	after	
the	Sarin	gas	attacks	was	to	treat	the	counterterrorism	operation	as	a	criminal	affair	
instead	of	a	military	one.	The	main	way	they	did	this	was	by	choosing	to	punish	the	leaders	
and	perpetrators	of	the	attack,	as	opposed	to	the	entire	Aum	Shinrikyo	religion.	This	gave	
many	of	the	members	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	an	opportunity	to	opt	out	of	the	organization	and	it	
prevented	members	uninvolved	in	the	attack	from	feeling	persecuted	by	the	government.	
This	strategy	ensured	that	after	the	removal	of	Shoko	Asahara,	the	ideology	of	Aum	
Shinrikyo	was	not	strong	enough	to	allow	for	the	continued	use	of	terrorism	by	the	
organization.	This	lesson	is	particularly	relevant	to	the	United	States’	counterterrorism	
operations	against	Islamic	terrorist	organizations	and	supports	the	policy	of	the	United	
States	to	make	clear	that	it	is	not	at	war	with	Islam,	but	rather	a	group	of	violent	criminals.		
While	the	case	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	provides	useful	variables	for	evaluating	the	
effectiveness	of	leadership	removal	on	terrorist	organizations,	there	are	potential	problems	
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with	trying	to	apply	the	case	too	broadly.	The	case	can	be	criticized	because,	unlike	most	
terrorist	organizations,	many	of	the	members	who	joined	Aum	Shinrikyo	had	no	inkling	of	
the	terrorist	wing	of	the	organization.101	Therefore,	some	of	the	collapse	in	the	Aum	
Shinrikyo	organization	might	have	been	due	to	the	horrified	members	finding	out	about	the	
nature	of	the	organization	they	joined.	This	would	make	it	hard	to	pinpoint	the	blame	for	
Aum	Shinrikyo’s	collapse	on	the	removal	of	Shoko	Asahara.		
This	criticism	of	the	Aum	Shinrikyo	case	tends	to	discount	the	capacity	of	the	
organization.	Even	though	some	members	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	were	unaware	of	all	of	the	
group’s	terrorist	involvement,	a	large	number	of	them	were	dedicated	to	terrorist	
activities.	The	creation	of	biological	weapons	required	lots	of	inputs,	not	only	of	equipment	
and	workers,	but	also	experts	and	scientific	know-how.102	This	was	an	operation	that	
required	the	knowledge	of	many	individuals	within	Aum	Shinrikyo.	Additionally,	even	
before	the	Tokyo	subway	attack,	Aum	Shinrikyo	had	been	involved	in	a	series	of	terrorist	
activities.	Between	1992-1995,	the	group	had	been	involved	in	a	string	of	murders	and	had	
also	launched	another	Sarin	gas	attack	in	Japan,	although	this	one	was	much	less	lethal	than	
the	1995	attack.103	The	definitive	stop	to	Aum	Shinrikyo’s	ability	to	function	as	a	terrorist	
organization	occurred	when	Shoko	Asahara	was	captured.	
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Chapter IV 
	
Hamas		
	 The	case	of	Hamas	illustrates	how	terrorist	organizations	that	are	not	dependent	on	
charismatic	authority	and	have	strong	institutional	structures	will	be	resilient	to	leadership	
removal.	While	Hamas	had	a	very	charismatic	leader,	charismatic	authority	was	not	
important	in	keeping	the	organization	together.	Instead,	Hamas	relied	heavily	on	its	
sophisticated	organizational	structure	and	local	networks	to	support	the	organization’s	
terrorist	activities.	This	structure	allowed	Hamas	to	easily	absorb	the	shock	of	leadership	
removal	and	ultimately	leadership	removal	ended	up	strengthening	Hamas’	position	in	the	
West	Bank.		
Background	
	 In	the	1970s,	the	Israeli	government	and	the	Palestinian	Liberation	Organization	
(PLO)	were	the	two	main	actors	in	the	Israeli	Palestinian	crisis.	They	clashed	violently	in	
Israel,	Palestine,	and	the	Gaza	Strip.	To	adapt	to	Israel’s	overwhelming	military	superiority,	
the	PLO	embraced	terrorism	to	not	only	to	combat	Israel	but	also	to	raise	the	profile	of	the	
Palestinian	liberation	struggle.104	In	the	midst	of	this	violent	turmoil,	a	small	offshoot	of	the	
regional	Muslim	Brotherhood	organization	broke	away	from	the	main	organization	and	
formed	its	own	Islamic	group.	In	1978,	this	organization	was	officially	recognized	by	the	
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Israeli	Military	Administrative	and	given	the	right	to	set	up	administrative	units	and	
control	religious	and	educational	institutions	in	the	West	Bank.105	The	Israel	government	
hoped	this	organization	would	compete	with	the	PLO	for	supporters	thereby	weakening	
Palestine	resistance	to	Israel.106	The	Israel	government	could	not	have	known	at	the	time	
that	they	had	just	given	the	green	light	to	an	organization	that	would	evolve	into	one	of	the	
most	sophisticated	and	capable	terrorist	organizations	in	the	region	and	one	of	Israel’s	
greatest	enemies.		
	 The	co-founder	of	the	new	organization,	Sheikh	Ahmed	Yassin,	had	no	interest	in	
creating	an	organization	that	would	only	focus	on	development	in	the	West	Bank.	From	the	
beginning	he	imagined	his	organization	as	a	group	that	would	reclaim	all	of	Palestine	for	
Palestinians.107		To	make	the	goal	of	his	organization	clear,	he	named	it	Harakat	al-
Muqawama	al-Islamiyya	(Hamas),	which	translates	to	the	Islamic	Resistance	Movement.108	
Hamas	quickly	occupied	a	unique	position	in	a	region	that	was	filled	with	resistance	groups	
and	terrorist	organizations.		
	 Hamas	had	a	couple	of	advantages	that	helped	it	grow	strong	in	its	early	years.	First,	
it	was	an	Islamic	organization	and	it	fought	not	only	to	reclaim	Palestine	in	general,	but	
also	to	make	liberated	Palestine	an	Islamic	state.109	This	helped	distinguish	Hamas	from	its	
much	larger	and	more	established	rival,	the	PLO,	which	was	a	secular	organization.	
Secondly,	Hamas	benefited	from	fortunate	timing.	The	organization’s	early	years	coincided	
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with	the	end	of	the	first	intifada.	The	bloody	struggle	between	the	PLO	and	Israel	had	not	
only	degraded	the	operational	capacity	of	the	PLO,	but	also	left	the	organization	bankrupt	
in	the	minds	of	many	Palestinians.110	This	provided	the	groundwork	for	Hamas	to	quickly	
expand.	Finally,	while	the	PLO	at	the	end	of	the	first	intifada	was	willing	to	negotiate	with	
Israel,	Hamas	remained	committed	to	refusing	to	acknowledge	Israel’s	right	to	exist.111	
After	several	years	of	quickly	growing,	Hamas	became	a	dominant	regional	actor.		
	 Hamas	was	able	to	use	its	growing	clout	to	stand	out	as	a	major	player	in	the	second	
intifada.	As	the	Palestinian	region	once	again	erupted	into	conflict,	Hamas	stood	out	for	the	
brutality	of	its	attacks.	Under	the	direction	of	Yassin,	Hamas	adopted	suicide	bombing	as	its	
primary	strategy.112	In	Yassin’s	mind,	the	suicide	bomber	was	the	only	response	
Palestinians	had	to	Israel	tanks.	Hamas	was	the	only	organization	in	the	conflict	to	fully	
engage	in	a	campaign	of	suicide	bombing,	causing	the	organization	to	stand	out	in	the	
Israeli	defense	establishment’s	mind	as	a	major	threat.	
	 Understandably,	the	campaign	of	Hamas	suicide	bombers	caused	a	lot	of	fear	in	
Israel.	By	their	very	nature,	suicide	bombers	cannot	be	deterred.	The	only	way	to	stop	
suicide	bombers	is	to	deny	them	access	to	their	target	or	to	prevent	individuals	from	
deciding	to	become	suicide	bombers	in	the	first	place.	Major	Israeli	defense	officials	started	
to	look	at	leadership	removal	as	a	way	fulfill	the	latter	option.113	Yassin	was	the	leader	of	
Hamas	who	made	it	the	strategy	of	the	organization	to	undertake	suicide	bombings	and	
who	was	insistent	on	refusing	to	recognize	the	right	of	Israel	to	exist.114	Over	the	course	of	
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the	previous	decade,	he	had	spent	much	of	his	life	in	and	out	of	Israeli	prisons,	and	had	
even	been	given	a	life	sentence	at	one	point	in	time	only	to	be	released	in	a	prisoner	
exchange.115	When	the	Israel	state	struck	this	time,	they	would	remove	him	permanently.		
	 Since	2000,	Israel	had	acknowledged	that	they	engaged	in	a	policy	of	targeted	
assassination	against	certain	militants.116	The	decision	to	target	Yassin	was	different	than	
most	of	Israel’s	previous	operations	though,	because	Yassin	was	not	just	some	mid-level	
commander	or	bomber	maker,	but	the	main	political	leader	of	Hamas.117	This	was	
important	because	Hamas	was	not	just	a	terrorist	organization	but	also	a	legitimate	
political	entity	that	provided	social	services,	set	up	schools,	and	ran	charities	across	the	
Gaza	Strip	and	West	Bank.118	Targeting	such	a	leader	would	send	a	signal	that	the	rules	of	
engagement	had	changed	and	risked	international	condemnation.		
	 Despite	the	risks,	Israel	determined	that	the	potential	damage	to	the	organization	of	
Hamas	that	leadership	removal	could	accomplish	was	greater	than	the	risks,	and	despite	
being	in	a	cease-fire	with	Hamas	at	the	time	gave	the	green	light	for	the	assassination.	On	
the	22nd	of	March	2004,	an	Israel	F-16	flew	over	the	home	of	Yassin.	The	roar	of	the	jet’s	
engines	drowned	out	the	noise	of	two	Apache	attack	helicopters	as	they	made	their	
approached.	As	Yassin	was	wheeled	out	of	his	home	on	his	daily	trip	the	mosque,	the	
helicopters	fired	hellfire	missiles	at	Yassin	instantly	killing	him,	his	two	bodyguards,	and	
inflicting	significant	collateral	damage	including	wounding	two	of	Yassin’s	sons.119	Despite	
the	collateral	damage	though,	the	operation	was	considered	a	success	and	the	Israel	
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defense	establishment	expected	Hamas	to	suffer	significantly	from	the	loss	of	their	political	
and	spiritual	leader.		
The	Charismatic	Authority	of	Yassin	within	Hamas	
	 While	I	have	listed	Hamas	as	an	organization	with	low	levels	of	charismatic	
authority,	there	is	no	denying	that	Sheikh	Ahmed	Yassin	was	a	charismatic	individual.	
When	Yassin	was	16	years	old,	he	suffered	an	accident	while	playing	on	a	beach	that	
damaged	his	spinal	cord	and	left	him	confined	to	a	wheelchair	for	the	rest	of	his	life.120	
Much	like	Shoko	Asahara	of	Aum	Shinrikyo,	Yassin	took	his	personal	disability	and	used	it	
to	enhance	his	personal	authority.	His	calm	demeanor,	wizard	like	appearance,	and	being	
confined	to	a	wheelchair	gave	Yassin	the	air	of	an	individual	who	was	close	to	God,	which	
increased	the	legitimacy	of	Yassin	spiritual	directives.	This	was	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	
Yassin	had	never	actually	received	any	type	of	official	religious	training.	There	is	no	doubt	
that	Yassin	used	his	charismatic	appeal	to	his	advantage	as	the	spiritual	and	political	leader	
of	Hamas.		
	 Yassin	also	showed	great	charisma	through	his	piety.	While	Yassin	had	the	means	to	
live	comfortably,	he	chose	to	live	a	very	modest	lifestyle.	He	was	very	committed	to	the	
teaching	of	Islam	and	attended	prayer	daily.121	He	gave	extensively	to	charities,	in	
particular	to	religious	and	educational	charities.122	He	did	this	in	spite	of	having	eleven	
children	of	his	own	with	his	wife.123	Yassin’s	lifestyle	made	him	seem	to	truly	be	a	man	of	
the	people.	The	people	of	Gaza	saw	themselves	in	him	and	saw	him	as	a	father	figure	to	all	
of	them.	This	made	Yassin	an	unbelievably	popular	political	leader.		
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	 Given	that	Yassin	is	clearly	a	charismatic	leader,	why	have	I	chosen	to	classify	
Hamas	as	an	organization	with	low	levels	of	charismatic	authority?	The	reason	is	that	while	
Yassin	was	a	leader	with	clear	charismatic	traits	he	failed	to	consolidate	charismatic	
authority	within	Hamas	behind	him.	Charismatic	authority	is	not	simply	the	existence	of	
charisma	within	an	individual,	it	is	the	use	of	the	authority	granted	by	charisma	to	exert	an	
individual’s	will	over	an	organization	and	weld	it	together.	This	did	not	happen	in	the	case	
of	Hamas.		
	 One	of	the	clearest	illustrations	of	how	charismatic	authority	was	not	consolidated	
across	Hamas	is	in	local	level	dynamics.	While	at	the	top,	Hamas	was	an	hierarchical	
organization,	at	the	local	level,	Hamas	was	a	networked	organization	focused	around	many	
different	local	leaders	who	held	authority	in	their	communities	based	on	family	ties,	
religious	affiliations,	or	personal	charisma.124	This	led	to	many	situations	where	the	
authority	of	local	or	mid-level	leaders	ended	up	trumping	Yassin’s	authority.	For	example,	
during	Hamas’	conflict	with	Israel	in	2000,	Yassin	made	it	clear	that	he	would	not	negotiate	
with	Israel.	The	military	wing,	‘Izz	al-Din	al-Qassam	blatantly	ignored	Yassin	and	issued	an	
order	to	Hamas	military	units	to	stop	engaging	Israel	and	declare	a	truce.125	This	led	to	a	
very	public	fight	between	Yassin	and	the	military	groups,	in	which	Yassin	had	to	make	a	
public	announcement	that:	“Hamas	did	not	declare	a	truce.	.	.	.	The	political	wing,	not	the	
military	wing	drafts	the	politics	of	Hamas.”126	Despite	the	charismatic	appeal	of	Yassin,	he	
failed	to	consolidate	his	authority	over	Hamas.	Indeed,	by	the	time	of	his	assassination,	
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Yassin,	despite	being	its	official	political	leader,	was	not	heavily	involved	in	the	day-to-day	
operations	of	Hamas.			
	 Another	reason	that	Yassin	failed	to	consolidate	his	charismatic	authority	was	that	
many	of	the	traits	that	were	essential	to	his	charisma	were	not	considered	unique	to	him	
but	rather	a	product	of	the	organization	of	Hamas.	In	order	to	establish	authority,	it	is	very	
important	that	the	charismatic	traits	of	the	leader	are	considered	to	be	unique.	Shoko	
Asahara	was	considered	the	only	person	in	the	organization	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	who	had	
obtained	enlightenment,	which	provided	him	and	no	one	else	the	ultimate	authority	within	
the	organization.	In	Hamas	though,	the	traits	that	made	Yassin	popular	and	charismatic	
were	common	among	the	general	leadership.	For	example,	much	of	Yassin’s	appeal	came	
from	his	modest	lifestyle	and	how	in	touch	with	the	struggles	of	ordinary	people	he	
remained	despite	being	in	the	political	leadership.127	However,	this	was	true	across	all	
levels	of	leadership	within	Hamas.	At	every	level,	members	of	Hamas	were	considered	to	be	
clean	and	honest	individuals,	in	contrast	to	its	rival	in	the	PLO,	who	cared	deeply	about	the	
prosperity	of	its	people.128	The	ubiquitous	nature	of	these	traits	within	the	organization	of	
Hamas	makes	it	difficult	for	one	leader	to	use	the	traits	to	claim	absolute	authority.	Instead	
within	the	eyes	of	the	members	of	Hamas	it	is	the	organization	itself,	rather	than	any	
individual	leader	within	the	organization,	that	holds	authority.	The	success	of	Hamas	in	
consolidating	authority	behind	the	organization	instead	of	behind	its	leaders	has	much	to	
thank	from	the	institutionalization	of	the	organization.		
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Institutionalization	in	Hamas	
Hamas	has	a	complicated	but	remarkably	effective	institutional	layout	that	allows	
the	organization	to	balance	multiple	goals	while	operating	under	significant	pressure.	The	
organization	of	Hamas	is	split	into	four	separate	units,	security,	military,	political	activities,	
and	Islamic	teaching.129	Every	single	one	of	these	units	is	well	organized	in	a	bureaucratic	
fashion	with	each	having	their	own	office	in	the	Gaza	Strip.130	Overseeing	these	four	
administrative	units	is	a	political	bureau	and	consultative	council	that	are	the	main	
authority	wielding	organs	in	Hamas.		
While	Yassin	was	the	most	visible	and	powerful	leader	within	the	political	bureau	
and	consultative	council,	he	was	far	from	the	only	high-powered	political	figure	in	these	
institutions.	In	Hamas’	upper	echelons,	there	were	two	types	of	leaders,	insiders	and	
outsiders.131	The	insiders	were	leaders	who	were	in	the	Gaza	Strip	and	the	West	Bank	
dealing	with	the	daily	administrative	functions	of	Hamas.132	The	outside	leaders	operated	a	
sophisticated	support	network	for	Hamas	abroad	that	tried	to	increase	support	for	the	
cause	of	Palestinian	liberation	in	the	international	community,	particularly	among	
European	Muslims.	The	outside	leadership	sat	atop	their	own	sophisticated	institutional	
infrastructure	that	organized	large	events,	issued	its	own	publications,	and	actively	raised	
money	for	Hamas.133	The	outside	leadership	even	had	its	own	office	in	Dallas,	Texas,	until	
Hamas	was	branded	by	the	United	States	as	a	terrorist	organization.134	Both	the	outside	
and	inside	leadership	of	Hamas	had	an	equal	number	of	representatives	in	the	political	
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bureau	and	consultative	council	that	ensured	that	even	though	there	was	a	hierarchy	of	
leaders	within	those	bodies,	there	was	enough	power	sharing	that	no	one	leader	was	too	
essential	to	the	organization	as	a	whole.135		
	The	smaller	administrative	branches	within	Hamas	also	helped	insulate	it	from	the	
impacts	of	leadership	removal.	Hamas	was	not	just	a	terrorist	organization	but	also	a	
governing	organization	that	provided	for	the	social	services	and	education	of	the	Gaza	Strip	
and	West	Bank.136	This	aspect	of	Hamas	provided	two	important	benefits	to	the	
organization	that	increased	it	resilience	to	leadership	removal.	First,	the	presence	of	
administrative	units	within	the	Gaza	Strip	and	West	Bank	increased	the	legitimacy	of	the	
organization	of	Hamas	in	the	eyes	of	its	people.	Hamas’	work	in	the	Gaza	Strip	and	West	
Bank	elevated	the	importance	of	the	organization	over	the	importance	of	the	organization’s	
top	leader.	Secondly,	the	different	administrative	units	of	Hamas	provided	a	training	
ground	for	future	leaders	of	the	organization	and	increased	the	authority	of	local	leaders	
within	Hamas.	Hamas’	political	administrative	unit	in	particular	was	full	of	professional	
bureaucrats	operating	within	a	well-established	institutional	arrangement.137	Not	only	did	
this	give	Hamas	a	deep	well	of	political	talent	to	draw	on,	it	also	meant	that	the	
administrative	units	were	the	organization’s	most	visible	face	to	its	supporters.	This	
diluted	the	importance	of	Hamas’	top	leadership.			
Furthermore,	the	networked	organization	of	Hamas	on	the	local	level	also	diluted	
the	authority	of	the	top	leadership,	making	the	organization	more	resilient	to	leadership	
removal.	As	mentioned	in	the	previous	section,	at	the	local	level,	Hamas	was	a	networked	
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association	of	interpersonal	relationships.138	This	organization	style	meant	that	local	
leaders	were	the	most	important	figures	within	their	jurisdiction,	and	that	made	the	overall	
organization	less	reliant	on	a	hierarchal	structure	to	operate	effectively.	This	meant	that	on	
a	local	level,	the	policies	and	choices	of	Hamas	were	determined	more	through	an	
interaction	of	important	local	political	figures	than	the	decisions	of	the	organization’s	top	
leaders.	In	Hamas,	decision-making	was	focused	on	discussions	and	consensus	building.	
The	orders	of	local	leaders	were	carried	out	on	the	basis	of	local	information	and	with	the	
use	of	local	resources,	and	local	activists	were	independent	political	agents	concerned	
about	local	issues	and	being	competent	in	their	positions	as	opposed	to	simply	general	
administrators	whose	sole	function	was	to	blindly	follow	directives	from	the	top.139				
In	addition	to	providing	a	counter	veiling	force	to	the	authority	of	the	central	
leadership,	the	different	administrative	units	of	Hamas	also	pooled	resources	and	
supported	each	other.140	The	parts	of	Hamas	that	were	involved	in	the	struggle	for	
Palestinian	liberation	and	the	terrorism	that	accompanied	it,	and	the	parts	of	Hamas	
involved	in	the	administration	of	the	Gaza	Strip	and	West	Bank,	while	having	separate	
official	administrative	bodies,	were	tightly	bound	together.	The	charities	run	by	the	
organization,	in	addition	to	the	good	they	did	for	the	Palestinian	people,	also	funneled	cash	
into	the	provision	of	armaments.141	Local	leaders	used	the	authority	they	had	within	their	
communities	to	recruit	members	to	Hamas’	military	wing,	and	used	local	networks	to	
increase	the	efficiency	of	intelligence	gathering.	These	types	of	activities	ensured	that	there	
were	strong	linkages	and	a	long	record	of	communication	and	collaboration	between	the	
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different	administrative	units	of	Hamas.	These	linkages	served	to	undercut	the	importance	
of	hierarchy	in	Hamas,	making	the	overall	organizational	structure	look	more	like	a	web	
than	a	pyramid.		
The	Effects	of	Leadership	Removal	on	Hamas	
Hamas	is	seemingly	a	perfect	example	of	the	institutionalization	theory	in	practice.	
Hamas	is	an	enormous	organization	with	a	wide	range	of	responsibilities	to	carry	out.	In	
order	most	efficiently	execute	its	responsibilities,	a	massive	institutional	structure	
supports	Hamas.	This	structure	undercuts	the	importance	of	any	one	leader	to	the	overall	
organization	and	ensures	that	the	organization	will	be	resilient	in	the	face	of	leadership	
removal.	Even	though	Hamas	had	a	charismatic	head	in	Yassin,	the	structure	of	the	
organization	prevented	him	from	consolidating	his	charismatic	authority,	reducing	his	
overall	importance	to	Hamas.		
Just	looking	at	the	raw	empirical	data	on	the	lethality	of	Hamas	though,	it	is	easy	to	
reach	the	opposite	conclusion.	The	year	Yassin	was	assassinated,	Hamas	was	62%	less	
lethal	than	it	had	been	the	year	before	and	wounded	64%	fewer	people	(See	Table	2).142	
Furthermore,	in	the	proceeding	two	years,	Hamas’	lethality	continued	to	fall	and	remained	
far	below	its	peak	in	2002.	The	lethality	of	Hamas	only	rebounded	in	2007	three	years	after	
leadership	removal.143	From	the	raw	numbers	it	appears	that	leadership	removal	had	a	
significant	impact	on	Hamas.		
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Hamas’	Terrorist	Activity	2001-2007	
Year	 Attacks		 Killed		 Wounded	
2001	 39	 136	 791	
2002	 34	 207	 729	
2003		 39	 131	 344	
2004	(removal)	 19	 49	 125	
2005	 22	 16	 21	
2006	 27	 13	 31	
2007	 65	 109	 344	
Table	2	
There	are	two	problems	with	using	the	aggregate	data	to	discount	the	theory	of	
organizational	resilience	and	claim	victory	for	leadership	removal.	Firstly,	the	data	is	also	
displaying	efforts	by	the	Israeli	government	to	reduce	the	lethality	of	Hamas	that	were	not	
leadership	targeting,	and,	secondly,	breaking	the	data	down	reveals	a	significant	revenge	
effect	in	response	to	leadership	removal.		
There	were	two	developments	outside	of	leadership	removal	that	caused	the	
number	of	terrorist	attacks	by	Hamas	to	drop	so	significantly	from	2003	to	2004.	The	first	
development	was	an	agreed	ceasefire	between	Israel	and	Hamas.	Both	parties	were	
exhausted	from	the	brutality	of	the	first	intifada,	so	had	agreed	to	an	uneasy	ceasefire	
during	2004.144	While	the	data	shows	that	the	ceasefire	was	not	completely	successful,	a	
significant	drop	in	the	level	of	terrorist	attacks	attributed	to	Hamas	can	be	attributed	to	the	
ceasefire.		
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	The	second,	and	more	important,	development	in	the	Israeli	Palestinian	crisis	that	
contributed	to	the	decrease	of	lethality	of	Hamas	was	the	construction	of	the	West	Bank	
Barrier,	which	was	completed	at	the	end	of	2003.	As	stated	earlier,	Hamas	was	notable	as	a	
terrorist	organization	because	of	its	prolific	use	of	suicide	bombers	and	they	only	way	to	
stop	suicide	bombers	is	to	prevent	their	recruitment	or	prevent	them	from	accessing	their	
targets.145	The	West	Bank	Barrier	was	a	series	of	walls	and	security	checkpoints	that	
isolated	the	West	Bank	from	Israel	denying	suicide	bombers	access	to	Israeli	targets.146	The	
effectiveness	of	this	strategy	can	be	seen	in	how	Hamas	shifted	its	targeting.	When	the	
lethality	of	Hamas	increased	back	to	the	level	comparable	to	the	2000-2003	period,	the	
locations	of	its	targets	had	changed	to	be	almost	entirely	in	the	West	Bank	since	its	
bombers	had	a	much	harder	time	accessing	Israel.	147	The	effect	that	the	data	on	lethality	is	
showing	in	the	case	of	Hamas	is	not	that	leadership	removal	reduced	the	operational	
capacity	of	Hamas	but	rather	that	the	West	Bank	Barrier	made	the	primary	strategy	of	
Hamas	less	lethal.		
This	conclusion	is	reinforced	when	the	data	on	the	number	of	attacks	is	more	closely	
examined.	While	the	year	of	Yassin	assassination	also	had	the	fewest	number	of	attack	
perpetrated	by	Hamas,	as	well	as	the	fewest	deaths,	this	is	mostly	because	of	the	
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ceasefire.148	In	2004,	before	the	assassination	of	Yassin,	there	were	only	five	terrorist	
attacks	by	Hamas.	The	assassination	of	an	old,	ailing,	half-blind,	wheel	chair	bound	man	by	
Israeli	gunships	though,	made	the	members	of	Hamas	angry	enough	to	retract	the	ceasefire	
and	increase	attacks	on	Israel	in	retaliation.149	In	the	part	of	2004	after	the	death	of	Yassin,	
the	number	of	terrorist	attacks	rose	to	fourteen,	but	because	of	the	effectiveness	of	the	
West	Bank	Barrier,	the	fatalities	of	these	attacks	deceased.150	In	2007,	Hamas	actually	
launched	more	attacks	than	it	did	during	its	most	lethal	year	in	2002,	but	the	death	to	
attack	ratio	fell	from	6:1	to	1.6:1.151	The	drop	in	the	effectiveness	in	suicide	bombing	can	
again	be	credited	to	the	West	Bank	Barrier.	By	2007,	Hamas	was	barely	able	to	launch	a	
single	attack	in	the	state	of	Israel	and	instead	focused	all	of	its	attacks	in	the	West	Bank,	
which	had	fewer	of	the	soft	targets	that	made	suicide	bombing	so	successful	in	the	early	
2000s.152		
Since	there	were	complicating	variables	during	Hamas	leadership	removal,	the	best	
way	to	determine	the	effects	of	leadership	removal	is	to	examine	how	the	internal	
dynamics	of	Hamas	changed	after	Yassin’s	death.	Within	Hamas,	Yassin	was	quickly	
replaced	by	Abdel	Aziz	Al-Rantissi.	Rantissi	was	a	leader	who	was	a	decade	younger	than	
Yassin	and	very	energetic	with	his	own	charismatic	appeal.153	Rantissi	had	no	issues	
effectively	assuming	command	within	Hamas.	He	did	not	alter	the	organization’s	stance	on	
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Israel	or	its	commitment	to	the	use	of	suicide	bombers.154	He	was	so	successful	in	replacing	
Yassin	that	Israel	decided	he	had	to	go.	He	was	assassinated	after	a	little	more	than	a	month	
in	Hamas’	top	position.155	Even	the	assassination	of	Rantissi	though,	did	not	disrupt	the	
functioning	of	Hamas.156	What	the	assassination	did	do	was	increase	the	power	of	the	
outside	leadership	in	the	political	bureau	of	Hamas.	Ironically,	this	was	a	bad	development	
for	Israel	because	the	outside	leadership	tended	to	be	more	radical	than	the	inside	
leadership	since	they	were	less	concerned	about	on	the	ground	developments.157	
Leadership	removal	did	not	disrupt	the	leadership	of	Hamas,	it	just	empowered	the	more	
radical	leaders	within	Hamas.		
In	addition	to	failing	to	disrupt	the	leadership	of	the	organization,	leadership	
removal	also	increased	the	political	strength	of	Hamas.	Hamas	for	most	of	its	existence	had	
operated	as	an	inferior	organization	to	the	PLO.	The	PLO	had	a	longer	history	of	struggle	
against	Israel,	held	significantly	more	resources	than	Hamas,	and	most	importantly,	had	
more	support	among	the	general	population.158	After	the	assassination	of	Yassin	though,	
for	the	first	time	in	the	history	of	its	organizational	lifetime,	the	population	of	the	West	
Bank	had	a	more	favorable	view	of	Hamas	than	the	PLO.159	The	assassinations	of	its	leaders	
led	to	a	groundswell	of	support	for	an	organization	that	was	more	radical	than	the	PLO.	
Eventually,	Hamas	was	able	to	use	its	newfound	political	strength	to	increase	its	attacks	on	
Israel.	It	was	only	the	effectiveness	of	Israel’s	other	counterterrorism	policies	that	
prevented	Hamas	from	becoming	a	more	lethal	organization	after	leadership	removal.		
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The	case	of	Hamas	illustrates	how	institutionalized	terrorist	organizations	without	
consolidated	charismatic	authority	can	successfully	withstand	leadership	removal.	The	
case	supports	the	logic	laid	out	by	organizational	resilience	theorists	and	also	provides	
evidence	that	leadership	removal	can	be	counterproductive	to	counterterrorism	goals.	
Leadership	removal	cannot	be	viewed	as	a	silver	bullet	that	will	work	in	every	situation.		
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Chapter V 
	
The	PKK	
Leadership	removal	in	the	case	of	the	PKK	provides	valuable	insights	into	the	
competing	influences	of	charismatic	authority	and	institutionalization	within	terrorist	
groups.	On	one	hand,	the	loss	of	Abdullah	Öcalan’s	charismatic	authority	within	the	PKK	
after	his	removal	left	the	organization	rudderless	and	led	it	to	change	its	tactics	for	
achieving	political	change	from	terrorism	to	political	negotiation.	On	the	other	hand,	the	
highly	bureaucratic	and	institutional	nature	of	the	PKK	was	not	disrupted	by	leadership	
removal,	and	when	political	negotiations	with	the	Turkish	state	failed,	the	PKK	returned	to	
terrorism	and	proved	that	leadership	removal	had	not	diminished	its	operational	capacity.		
Background	
In	1984,	a	small	group	of	Kurdish	militants	attacked	Turkish	military	units	in	the	
predominantly	Kurdish	regions	of	the	country.	These	attacks	continued	sporadically	
throughout	the	year.160	At	first,	the	Turkish	government	paid	little	attention	to	the	attacks.	
Government	spokesmen	wrote	off	the	attacks	as	the	work	of	common	bandits.161	However,	
as	the	attacks	continued,	they	became	such	an	annoyance	to	the	Turkish	government	that	a	
military	response	was	launched.	Martial	law	was	declared	in	the	region,	which	allowed	for	
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the	government	to	conduct	military	operations.	At	first,	these	seemed	successful.	The	
militant	group	was	reduced	to	little	more	than	200	members.162	Eventually,	though,	the	
group	adapted	to	the	government’s	response	by	increasing	its	recruitment	efforts	and	
creating	a	sophisticated	training-regiment	for	its	members.	By	1987,	the	threat	couldn’t	be	
contained	and	the	Turkish	government	declared	a	state	of	emergency	across	ten	provinces	
in	southeastern	and	eastern	Turkey,	the	region	that	contained	most	of	the	state’s	Kurdish	
population.163	This	action	escalated	a	conflict	that	would	dominate	Turkish	affairs	
throughout	the	1990s	and	posed	a	real	threat	to	the	Turkish	state:	A	conflict	between	the	
Turkish	government	and	a	Kurdish-based	insurgent	group,	known	as	the	People’s	Kurdish	
Party	(PKK).		
By	the	1990s,	the	PKK	was	inflicting	serious	damage	on	the	Turkish	government.	
While	the	PKK	was	responsible	for	only	1,619	deaths	between	1984	and	1990,	from	1991	
to	1993,	it	killed	4,132	individuals.164	The	greater	death	toll	in	a	shortened	period	of	time	
showed	how	the	PKK	was	able	to	increase	its	operational	capacity,	despite	the	increased	
military	campaign	against	them.	The	PKK	also	employed	brutal	terrorist	attacks	as	one	of	
its	main	weapons	against	the	Turkish	state.	These	attacks	not	only	targeted	military	units,	
but	government	and	social	workers	as	well.	In	its	increased	campaign	against	the	Turkish	
states,	the	PKK	abducted	and	murdered	over	200	Turkish	teachers	in	Kurdish	regions	over	
a	three-year	period.165	The	PKK	operational	capacity	was	so	great	that	for	much	of	the	
southeastern	and	southern	parts	of	Turkey,	residents	were	members	of	the	Turkish	state	
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by	day	,but	would	be	under	the	authority	of	the	PKK	at	night.	In	some	areas	of	Turkey,	the	
central	government	lost	all	functional	control.166		
The	PKK	had	been	founded	as	a	Marxist-Leninist	Party	by	Abdullah	Öcalan.	After	a	
few	years	of	failing	to	gain	significant	momentum	within	Turkish	institutions,	Öcalan	
reorganized	the	PKK	for	the	purpose	of	becoming	the	sole	representative	for	the	Kurdish	
people	in	an	armed	struggle	against	the	Turkish	state.167	Through	brilliant	and	often	brutal	
political	maneuvering,	Öcalan	managed	to	position	the	PKK	as	the	only	legitimate	
organization	that	could	respond	to	the	needs	of	the	Kurdish	population.		
Öcalan’s	prominent	role	in	the	PKK	made	him	an	ideal	target	for	the	Turkish	
government.	As	the	lethality	of	the	PKK	continued	to	increase	over	the	course	of	the	1990s,	
the	Turkish	government	made	the	capturing	or	killing	of	the	elusive	Öcalan	one	of	their	top	
priorities.168	Eventually,	in	1999,	Turkish	intelligence	officials	discovered	that	Öcalan	was	
staying	in	Damascus.	The	Turkish	government	sent	the	Syrian	government	an	ultimatum:	
give	up	Öcalan	or	face	immediate	invasion.169	The	Syrian	government	capitulated	to	
Turkish	demands	and,	after	a	series	of	long	and	highly	publicized	flights,	Öcalan	ended	up	
in	the	hands	of	Turkish	officials.170		
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Charismatic	Authority	in	the	PKK	
Öcalan	displayed	a	significant	level	of	charismatic	authority	over	the	PKK.	The	
followers	of	the	organization	affectionately	nicknamed	him	Apo,	short	for	Abdullah,	and	
viewed	him	as	a	father	figure,	not	only	for	the	organization,	but	for	the	Kurdish	people	as	
well.171	Öcalan	certainly	did	his	best	to	cultivate	this	image.	In	response	to	his	followers	
nicknaming	him	Apo,	he	declared	that	all	members	of	the	PKK	would	be	called	Apocular	or	
“Apo’s	people.”	He	also	made	it	clear	that	he	was	one	with	the	organization.	Everything	that	
the	PKK	did,	every	attack	that	it	launched,	and	every	position	it	took,	was	claimed	as	the	
responsibility	of	Öcalan.172	He	built	himself	as	not	only	the	leader	of	the	PKK,	but	as	the	sole	
leader	and	sworn	protector	of	the	Kurdish	people.	The	greatest	success	of	his	charismatic	
authority	was	his	ability	to	tie	himself	into	ideas	of	Kurdish	identity.	
Öcalan,	much	like	Shoko	Asahara,	used	the	organizational	structure	of	the	PKK	to	
enhance	his	own	control	over	the	organization.	In	order	to	consolidate	his	charismatic	
authority	within	the	PKK,	Öcalan	centralized	the	organization	around	himself	and	removed	
rivals	within	the	PKK.	Öcalan	ran	the	PKK	in	an	incredibly	brutal	and	authoritarian	fashion.	
The	first	victims	of	the	PKK’s	violence	were	not	members	of	the	Turkish	government,	but	
fellow	Kurds.173	Öcalan	destroyed	any	other	group	that	tried	to	support	or	advocate	for	
Kurdish	rights.	After	he	had	consolidated	the	PKK	as	the	only	group	that	could	represent	
the	Kurdish	people,	he	quickly	went	about	eliminating	rival	leaders	within	the	PKK.	Under	
his	leadership,	purges	were	swift,	frequent,	and	brutal.	Öcalan	killed	every	founding	
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member	of	the	PKK,	other	than	himself.174	The	same	individuals	who	had	masterminded	
the	1984	attacks	against	the	Turkish	state	with	Öcalan	were	killed	because	of	the	risk	they	
posed	to	Öcalan’s	authority	within	the	PKK.		
No	official	was	too	close	to	Öcalan	to	be	safe	from	his	purges.	When	his	own	wife	
started	to	display	more	ambition	within	the	PKK	and	rumors	started	to	circulate	that	she	
could	become	a	successor	in	case	he	was	killed,	Öcalan	tried	to	assassinate	his	wife,	who	
only	escaped	by	fleeing	to	Europe.175	No	offense	was	too	small	to	incite	a	purge	either.	
Once,	one	high-ranking	official	within	the	PKK	suggested	to	Öcalan	that	they	should	focus	
more	heavily	on	engaging	with	European	Kurds	and	build	and	international	coalition	that	
would	employ	nonviolent	means	of	resistance	against	the	Turkish	state	instead	of	simply	
being	an	organization	for	Kurdish	armed	resistance.	Öcalan	did	not	take	this	well	and	had	
the	official	promptly	assassinated.176			
Institutionalization	in	the	PKK	
As	prevalent	as	charismatic	authority	was	within	the	PKK,	there	were	also	a	
multitude	of	factors	that	suggested	that	the	PKK	would	be	resilient	in	the	face	of	leadership	
removal.	One	of	these	factors	was	the	level	of	bureaucratization	within	the	PKK.	The	PKK	
was	such	a	large	organization,	and	included	so	many	different	branches	with	vastly	
different	goals	and	operations,	that	it	had	to	build	a	complex	bureaucracy	to	operate	
efficiently.	The	PKK	was	a	multi-branched	organization	with	a	main	operational	leadership	
group	in	located	in	Turkey	that	planned	and	executed	terrorist	attacks	for	the	organization.	
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Additionally,	the	PKK	had	two	sister	branches	in	Syria	and	Iraq,	which	were	responsible	for	
publications,	propaganda,	and	recruitment,	and	a	separate	organization	for	women	
fighters.177		
In	addition	to	how	large	the	PKK	was	as	an	organization,	it	also	took	on	complex	
state-building	and	political	roles	that	forced	it	to	adopt	a	sophisticated,	institutional	
framework.	The	PKK,	at	various	points	in	its	violent	campaign	against	the	Turkish	state	
controlled	vast	amounts	of	land.	In	these	areas,	it	set	up	an	administrative	apparatus	that	
levied	taxes	on	the	local	population,	conducted	forced	enlistment	into	the	PKK,	and	
provided	social	services	to	Kurdish	residents.178	Not	only	did	the	PKK	have	its	own	
administrative	territory	to	run,	it	was	also	involved	in	Turkish	and	international	politics.	
While	the	PKK	was	banned	as	a	political	party	in	Turkey	at	this	time,	there	were	Kurdish	
members	of	the	Turkish	Parliament	within	existing	political	parties	that	harbored	
sympathies	with	the	PKK	and	would	work	with	the	organization	to	influence	the	Turkish	
government	within	Turkish	institutions.179	The	PKK	also	engaged	in	a	concentrated	effort	
to	build	support	among	the	Kurdish	diaspora	for	the	Kurdish	cause.	This	was	used	not	only	
to	increase	recruitment	for	the	PKK	using	the	diaspora,	but	also	to	use	the	diaspora	to	put	
pressure	on	foreign	governments	to	come	out	and	support	the	PKK’s	cause	in	the	
international	arena.180	These	political	positions	all	required	skill	and	capable	political	
operatives.	Given	the	wide	extent	and	far	reaching	activities	of	the	PKK	the	organization	
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should	have	had	the	ability	to	find	a	suitable	replacement	to	Öcalan	to	take	over	the	mantel	
of	the	PKK	after	his	capture.		
Another	reason	it	was	unlikely	that	leadership	removal	would	significantly	reduce	
the	lethality	of	the	PKK	is	that	the	underlining	motivation	and	justification	for	the	PKK	did	
not	go	away	with	the	capture	of	Öcalan.	The	PKK	became	the	official	body	of	Kurdish	
grievances	in	Turkey.181	The	Turkish	state	was	very	oppressive	toward	its	Kurdish	citizen	
and	treated	them	as	second	class	within	its	own	society.	The	Kurdish	regions	of	Turkey	are	
also	some	of	that	county’s	poorest	and	opportunities	for	advancement	among	the	Kurdish	
population	are	incredibly	low.182	The	military	campaign	by	the	Turkish	government	only	
exacerbated	Kurdish	grievances.	The	Turkish	response	to	PKK	attacks	was	often	brutal	and	
indiscriminate.	The	Turkish	army	frequently	embarked	on	reprisal	attacks	and	village-
burning	operations	as	part	of	their	counterterrorism	effort.183	Torture	of	suspects	without	
due	process	was	a	commonplace	occurrence	and	many	Kurds	would	be	abducted	by	the	
state	and	never	heard	from	again.	184	
Being	Kurdish	in	Turkey	has	real	implication	for	an	individual’s	life	chances.	Given	
the	politically	salience	of	Kurdish	ethnicity	in	Turkey	and	the	strong	institutional	structure	
of	the	PKK	to	support	its	terrorist	activities,	the	PKK	should	have	the	ability	to	recover	from	
leadership	removal.		
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Results	of	Leadership	Removal	
The	removal	of	Öcalan	from	the	head	of	the	PKK	had	a	profound	effect	on	the	
organization.	Directly	after	his	capture,	the	PKK	declared	a	unilateral	ceasefire	with	the	
Turkish	government.185	Despite	sporadic	breakdowns	in	the	ceasefire,	the	amount	of	
attacks	launched	by	the	PKK	fell	dramatically	(See	table	3)	and	the	PKK	continued	to	
engage	diplomatically	with	the	Turkish	government	throughout	the	mid	2000s.	For	the	
Turkish	government,	removing	Öcalan	had	an	immediate	and	positive	impact	on	their	
security.	Unfortunately,	the	chance	of	ending	the	conflict	through	political	negotiations	was	
squandered	and	the	PKK	returned	to	its	insurgency	against	the	Turkish	government.	When	
the	PKK	returned	to	arms,	they	proved	that	leadership	removal	had	not	altered	their	
organization’s	ability	to	conduct	violent	attacks.		
One	of	the	main	reasons	that	the	removal	of	Öcalan	led	the	PKK	to	switch	its	tactics	
to	political	negotiations	was	Öcalan’s	leadership	purges	had	removed	many	of	the	radical	
lower	level	leaders	within	the	PKK	allowing	for	more	moderate	voices	to	step	in.	Öcalan	
used	frequent	purges	of	the	PKK’s	leadership	as	a	means	to	enhance	his	own	charismatic	
authority	within	the	organization.	A	large	component	of	his	charismatic	authority	was	
melding	of	the	struggle	for	a	Kurdish	state	and	his	personal	brand.	Öcalan	built	this	myth	
that	he	was	the	only	person	within	the	PKK	who	could	lead	the	Kurdish	people	to	
liberation.	Leaders	within	the	PKK	who	were	more	radical	in	their	resistance	to	the	Turkish	
state	threatened	this	image	and	were	purged.	Subsequently	the	leaders	who	remained	in	
the	PKK	were	moderates	who	were	good	at	keeping	their	heads	down	and	carrying	out	the	
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will	of	Öcalan.	The	loss	of	Öcalan	allowed	these	leaders	to	step	in	and	change	the	direction	
of	the	organization.		
PKK	Terrorist	Activity	1997-2003186	
Year		 Attacks		 Deaths		 Wounded		
1997	 16	 127	 14	
1998	 11	 27	 37	
1999		 46	 105	 233	
2000	 3	 4	 2	
2001	 2	 7	 4	
2002	 0	 0	 0	
2003	 3	 7	 6	
Table	3		
The	capture	of	Öcalan	as	opposed	to	his	death	was	also	a	useful	force	in	reducing	the	
lethality	of	the	PKK.	Having	Öcalan	in	the	custody	of	the	Turkish	state	while	still	being	the	
head	of	the	PKK	put	the	organization	in	a	tricky	place.	Even	as	the	organization	was	roiling	
from	the	loss	of	its	founder	and	trying	to	find	replacements,	Öcalan	was	still	sending	orders	
to	the	organization	through	his	lawyers	and	family	visitors.187	It	was	Öcalan	who	proposed	
the	ceasefire	between	the	PKK	and	the	Turkish	government	while	he	was	in	custody.	The	
fact	that	his	health	and	well-being	depended	on	the	Turkish	state	probably	helped	convince	
him	to	switch	his	position	from	violent	confrontations	to	negotiation.	This	switch	in	
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position	sent	the	PKK	into	an	identity	crisis.	The	members	who	wanted	to	resist	could	not	
be	sure	if	there	were	members	of	the	organization	who	still	supported	Öcalan	enough	that	
they	would	try	to	oppose	them.	In	addition,	now	that	Öcalan	was	out	of	the	picture	there	
was	also	a	much	larger	moderate	voice	in	the	PKK	advocating	for	a	ceasefire.188		This	
moderate	voice	used	the	legitimacy	that	Öcalan	still	had	within	the	organization	to	pursue	
control	of	the	organization.	It	was	remarkably	effective,	as	almost	immediately	after	the	
capture	of	Öcalan	the	moderates	were	able	to	seize	control	of	the	PKK,	and	with	Öcalan’s	
blessing,	started	political	negotiations	with	Turkey.		
After	using	his	authority	to	help	justify	their	take	over	of	the	organization	though,	
the	new	leaders	of	the	PKK	started	to	reduce	Öcalan’s	authority	within	the	PKK.	Over	the	
next	couple	years,	the	PKK	repeatedly	rebranded	itself	as	a	way	to	diminish	Öcalan’s	hold	
over	the	organization.	This	was	only	partially	successful,	as	the	PKK	has	never	managed	to	
fully	disentangle	itself	from	Öcalan’s	image.	Even	today	under	the	banner	of	the	new	PKK	
Öcalan’s	imprisonment	is	still	used	as	a	bargaining	chip	in	negotiations	with	the	Turkish	
government.189	However,	Öcalan’s	imprisonment	is	no	longer	enough	to	keep	the	PKK	
away	from	using	terrorist	tactics.	After	years	of	failing	to	achieve	their	political	goals	
through	negotiations,	the	PKK	returned	to	its	insurgency	as	an	incredibly	capable	and	
effective	organization	(See	table	4).		
There	are	several	important	points	to	take	away	from	the	PKK	case.	First,	the	
reaction	of	the	PKK	to	the	removal	of	Öcalan	shows	that	charismatic	leaders	are	important	
to	the	direction	of	their	organization	even	when	their	organization	has	a	strong	
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institutional	structure	to	support	it.	Öcalan’s	capture	by	Turkey	fundamentally	altered	the	
actions	of	the	PKK.	He	had	so	successfully	consolidated	his	authority	within	the	PKK	that	he	
was	still	able	to	influence	the	decision	making	process	in	the	PKK	from	a	Turkish	prison.	
This	shows	that	despite	whatever	institutional	processes	are	in	place,	leaders	are	
incredibly	important	in	determining	how	their	organizations	are	run.	
PKK	Terrorist	Activity	2012-2016	
Year	 Attacks	 Killed		 Wounded	
2012	 43	 232	 390	
2013	 21	 14	 14	
2014	 66	 23	 41	
2015	 337	 424	 840	
2016	 379		 732	 2,088	
Table	4	
	 	The	PKK	case	also	illustrates	the	problems	with	viewing	leadership	removal	as	a	
military	strategy	against	terrorist	groups	with	high	levels	of	both	charismatic	authority	and	
institutionalization.	Leadership	removal	in	the	PKK	resulted	in	a	less	violent	organization	
not	because	the	organization	was	harmed	to	the	point	where	they	could	not	carry	violent	
attacks	against	Turkey,	but	because	leadership	removal	created	the	conditions	within	the	
PKK	for	political	change	to	occur	in	a	way	that	was	beneficial	to	Turkey.	When	the	PKK	
returned	to	it	insurgency	against	the	Turkish	state,	it	proved	that	it	had	maintained	a	high	
level	of	operational	capacity,	launching	a	greater	number,	and	more	violent,	attacks	than	it	
had	in	its	heyday	in	the	1990s.		
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	 The	more	effective	strategy	in	reducing	the	operational	capacity	of	the	PKK	was	the	
Turkish	military	campaign	against	them.		By	the	time	Öcalan	was	captured	by	the	Turkish	
state	in	1999,	the	PKK	had	been	decimated	by	a	brutal	Turkish	military	campaign	that	put	
the	organization	under	a	lot	of	pressure.	The	amount	and	lethality	of	the	PKK’s	attacks	had	
fallen	from	their	peak	in	the	mid-1990s.	The	PKK	had	lost	control	of	much	of	the	territory	
that	it	had	once	controlled	and	its	membership	had	been	severely	depleted	by	the	extended	
military	campaign.	Yet	while	the	military	campaign	was	able	to	degrade	the	operational	
capacity	of	the	PKK,	it	was	also	extremely	costly	to	the	Turkish	government.		Given	that	
leadership	removal	achieved	a	positive	political	outcome,	could	it	provide	a	cheap	political	
counterterrorism	policy	solution	for	terrorist	groups	with	high	levels	of	charismatic	
authority	and	institutionalization?		
	 		Unfortunately,	the	PKK	case	cannot	be	generalized	too	broadly	for	there	were	
many	factors	specific	to	the	PKK	that	led	to	the	PKK	choosing	to	enter	political	negotiations	
after	leadership	removal.	First,	Öcalan’s	consolidation	of	his	political	authority	within	the	
PKK	had	removed	more	radical	leaders	from	the	PKK	allowing	for	political	moderation	
after	his	removal.	This	is	not	always	the	case.	As	shown	in	the	Hamas	case,	leadership	
removal	can	strengthened	the	hand	of	radicals	within	the	organization.	Additionally,	the	
capture	of	Öcalan	also	helped	ensure	that	the	political	change	within	the	PKK	after	his	
removal	would	move	in	the	direction	of	moderation	but	it	is	not	always	possible	to	capture	
terrorist	leaders.	Leadership	removal	simply	creates	the	conditions	for	political	change	
within	a	terrorist	group;	it	does	not	ensure	that	the	political	change	will	have	positive	
counterterrorism	outcomes.	This	is	seen	in	the	next	chapter,	where	leadership	removal	led	
to	the	creation	of	more	violent	terrorist	groups.		
	 71	
	
	
	
Chapter VI 
	
Al	Qaeda	
Similar	to	the	case	of	the	PKK,	leadership	removal	in	Al	Qaeda	did	not	decrease	the	
operational	capacity	of	the	organization.	However,	unlike	the	PKK,	leadership	removal	in	Al	
Qaeda	caused	the	organization	to	become	more	violent	and	regionally-focused.			
Background	
	 In	1988,	a	multimillionaire	and	war	hero	from	the	Soviet-Afghan	war	set	about	
creating	a	new	organization	to	bring	the	ideas	of	a	jihadist	struggle	to	the	rest	of	the	Arab	
world.	This	man	was	Osama	Bin	Laden,	and	the	organization	that	he	founded,	Al	Qaeda,	
would	become	arguably	the	most	influential	terrorist	organization	in	history.	Its	actions	
defining	international	politics	for	the	beginning	of	the	21st	century.		
	 At	its	inception,	Al	Qaeda	had	trouble	distinguishing	itself	from	the	multitude	of	
militant	Islamist	organizations	in	the	Middle	East	at	the	time.	Like	many	other	groups,	it	
was	based	on	a	Salafiya-Jihadia	ideology	that	advocated	for	returning	the	Middle	East	to	
Muslim	rule.190	The	important	distinguishing	factor	for	Al	Qaeda	in	this	period	was	its	
leader,	Osama	Bin	Laden,	who	not	only	had	extensive	financial	resources	to	back	up	his	
infant	organization	but	was	already	inspiring	fanatical	devotion	in	Al	Qaeda’s	members.		
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	 After	several	years	of	engaging	in	terrorist	activities	against	the	regimes	of	Arab	
countries,	Bin	Laden,	frustrated	with	the	slow	progress	toward	the	organization’s	goals,	
changed	the	focus	of	Al	Qaeda.	In	his	mind,	the	authoritative	and	secular	regimes	of	the	
Arab	world	would	not	fall	to	terrorism	until	they	lost	the	support	of	their	powerful	western	
backers.191	Therefore,	Bin	Laden	switched	the	focus	of	Al	Qaeda	to	committing	acts	of	
terror	against	the	“far	enemy”,	the	United	States	and	its	Western	allies.192	His	hope	was	that	
the	public	of	the	United	States	would	be	unwilling	to	remain	involved	in	the	Middle	East	in	
the	face	of	the	terrorism.		
	 This	strategy	was	remarkably	successful	in	making	Al	Qaeda	stand	out	from	other	
militant	Islamic	groups,	and,	by	the	late	1990s,	Al	Qaeda	had	become	the	foremost	terrorist	
organization	in	the	Middle	East.	It	had	launched	dozen	of	attacks	against	international	
targets,	raising	the	organization’s	prominence	within	the	Jihadist	community	and	also	
putting	it	on	the	radar	of	Western	security	organizations.193	The	success	of	Al	Qaeda’s	early	
years	convinced	Bin	Laden	that	the	United	States	was	still	suffering	from	a	Vietnam	
complex	and	that	Al	Qaeda	had	the	ability	to	bleed	the	political	will	out	of	the	United	
States.194	This	conclusion	led	to	Bin	Laden’s	approval	of	the	world’s	most	infamous	
terrorist	attacks.		
	 On	September	11,	2001,	members	of	Al	Qaeda	hijacked	passenger	airlines	and	used	
them	to	attack	symbols	of	the	United	States’	economic	and	political	dominance.	Over	3,000	
civilians	died	in	the	deadliest	attack	on	American	soil.	In	response,	the	United	States	
government	declared	war	on	Al	Qaeda	and	its	affiliates,	wherever	they	resided	in	the	
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Authorization	of	Military	Force	Act.195	This	led	to	the	U.S.	invasion	of	Afghanistan	and	was	
one	of	many	justifications	used	for	the	invasion	of	Iraq.	For	a	decade,	one	of	the	main	
foreign	policy	goals	of	the	United	States	was	to	kill	or	capture	Osama	Bin	Laden.		On	May	
2nd	2011,	that	goal	was	finally	accomplished	when	U.S.	Navy	Seals	raided	a	compound	in	
Pakistan	and	killed	Osama	Bin	Laden.		
	 Al	Qaeda,	after	the	death	of	Osama	Bin	Laden,	provides	a	particularly	interesting	
case	study	into	the	effects	of	decapitation	on	a	terrorist	organization	because	of	Al	Qaeda’s	
unique	organizational	structure.	Osama	Bin	Laden	was	an	extremely	charismatic	individual	
and	his	personal	appeal	was	a	huge	part	of	the	success	of	Al	Qaeda.	At	the	same	time,	he	sat	
atop	a	sophisticated	institutional	structure	that	oversaw	an	organization	spanning	
countries	and	continents	and	containing	features	that	made	the	organization	resistant	to	
leadership	removal.		
Charismatic	Authority	in	Al	Qaeda	
	 Without	Osama	Bin	Laden,	there	would	have	been	no	Al	Qaeda.	It	was	his	
charismatic	authority	that	first	pulled	the	organization	together.	Through	brilliant	
propaganda	and	careful	presentation,	Bin	Laden	built	up	a	cult	of	personality	and	extended	
his	charismatic	authority	over	far-flung	branches	of	his	organization,	allowing	for	Al	Qaeda	
to	become	a	transnational	terrorist	organization.		
	 Much	of	Bin	Laden’s	charismatic	appeal	came	from	his	inspiring	backstory.	He	was	
the	son	of	an	incredibly	wealthy	Saudi	businessman.196	His	father	owned	the	largest	
company	in	Saudi	Arabia	and	when	he	died,	Osama	Bin	Laden	inherited	over	$20	million.	
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Despite	his	massive	personal	fortune,	Bin	Laden	felt	he	had	a	higher	calling.197	When	the	
mujahedeen	declared	a	holy	war	against	the	occupying	Soviet	forces,	Bin	Laden	not	only	
gave	them	extensive	financial	resources,	he	also	left	the	comfort	of	Saudi	Arabia	to	become	
a	field	commander	in	Afghanistan.198	It	was	there	that	he	made	a	name	for	himself	in	the	
jihad	movement.		
	 In	the	war	against	the	Soviet	Union,	Bin	Laden	stood	out	as	an	excellent	and	brave	
commander	adding	to	the	myth	surrounding	him.	In	the	spring	of	1987,	Bin	Laden	engaged	
Soviet	forces	in	the	battle	of	Jaji,	a	brutal,	weeks-long	battle.199	Personal	accounts	of	Bin	
Laden’s	bravery	made	it	into	the	militant	Islamist	magazine,	Jihad,	increasing	his	
recognition	across	the	region.200	Even	at	this	early	date,	before	the	organization	of	Al	Qaeda	
existed,	Bin	Laden	recognized	the	value	of	charismatic	authority.	When	he	met	some	
veteran	Islamists,	they	told	him	“You	are	the	leader	which	we	can	trust.	.	.	we	will	follow	
you.”201	This	meeting	planted	the	idea	in	Bin	Laden’s	mind	that	he	could	create	his	own	
Islamic	Army,	so	he	started	to	work	on	enhancing	his	charismatic	appeal.	Bin	Laden	invited	
Saudi	journalists	to	interview	him	and	even	created	a	documentary	about	his	struggles	in	
Afghanistan.202	This	care	for	his	image	would	become	a	hallmark	of	Al	Qaeda.		
	 From	its	inception,	Bin	Laden	recognized	the	importance	of	using	his	charisma	to	
establish	loyalty	within	the	rank	and	file	of	Al	Qaeda.	While	Al	Qaeda	was	still	a	struggling	
organization	in	Sudan,	Osama	cultivated	personal	loyalty	by	targeting	individuals	who	had	
																																								 																					
197	Peter	Bergen	and	Paul	Cruickshank,	“Revisiting	the	Early	Al	Qaeda:	An	Updated	Account	
of	its	Formative	Years,”	Studies	in	Conflict	and	Terrorism,	Vol.	35,	2012,	27.			
198	Bergen	and	Cruickshank,	“Revisiting	Early	Al	Qaeda,”	6.		
199	Ibid,	6.		
200	Ibid,	6.		
201	Ibid,	6.		
202	Bergen	and	Cruickshank,	“Revisiting	Early	Al	Qaeda,”	24.	
	 75	
been	abandoned	by	the	state	and	provided	them	not	only	with	financial	resources,	but	also	
with	the	feeling	that	his	organization	cared	about	them.203	Bin	Laden’s	son	testified	that	
this	strategy	was	incredibly	effective	in	inspiring	deep	personal	loyalty.	“Many	veterans	
told	my	brothers	and	me	that	our	father	was	the	only	one	who	never	forgot	them	.	.	.	they	
worshipped	him	with	their	whole	hearts.”204	For	Bin	Laden,	this	type	of	loyalty	was	not	a	
perk	of	his	organization	but	necessary	to	its	goals.	He	believed	that	jihad	would	only	
succeed	through	an	Arab	army	that	fought	under	the	principle	of	martyrdom.205	To	create	
this	force,	he	needed	to	have	something	that	people	would	be	willing	to	sacrifice	their	lives	
for	,and	he	found	that	in	his	charismatic	appeal.		
	 Bin	Laden’s	belief	in	the	importance	of	his	charismatic	appeal	can	also	be	seen	
through	Al	Qaeda’s	use	of	media.	Most	militant	Islamic	organizations,	such	as	the	Taliban,	
viewed	modern	media	as	contrary	to	Islamic	teachings	and	banned	it	from	their	
organizations.206	Bin	Laden,	on	the	other	hand	believed	that	media	was	instrumental	to	
accomplishing	Al	Qaeda’s	goals.	He	remarked	in	a	letter	to	Mullah	Omar,	“It	is	obvious	that	
the	media	war	in	this	century	is	one	of	the	strongest	methods;	in	fact,	its	ratio	may	reach	
90%	of	the	total	preparation	for	the	battles.”207	Al	Qaeda’s	use	of	media	let	it	extend	Bin	
Laden’s	charismatic	authority	and	helped	the	organization	receive	a	steady	stream	of	
foreign	fighters.	When	local	Islamist	groups	pledged	their	allegiance	to	Al	Qaeda	and	
adopted	their	media,	they	found	that	the	number	of	foreign	fighters	they	could	recruit	
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increased	dramatically.208	Even	the	Taliban	dropped	its	opposition	to	the	use	of	modern	
media	after	pledging	allegiance	to	Al	Qaeda.209		
	 Bin	Laden	was	also	very	conscious	to	ground	his	lifestyle	in	traditional	Islamic	
teachings.	Bin	Laden	was	a	fervently	religious	man	and	modeled	his	life	after	the	teachings	
of	the	Prophet	Mohammed.210	Despite	his	extraordinary	wealth,	Bin	Laden	lived	a	very	
modest	life.	He	slept	on	the	floor	and	ate	very	little	throughout	the	day.211	This	helped	
ground	Bin	Laden’s	charismatic	appeal	in	the	traditional	authority	of	Islam.	To	his	
followers,	Bin	Laden	was	not	just	a	savior	figure	who	would	usher	in	Islam	to	the	world,	he	
was	also	a	physical	embodiment	of	what	an	individual	should	be.		
In	person,	he	had	an	amazing	ability	to	make	people	like	him.	Despite	the	horrific	
acts	of	violence	that	Al	Qaeda	was	engaged	in,	Bin	Laden	was	reportedly	an	incredibly	
pleasant	man.	He	hated	disagreement	to	the	point	that	he	would	remain	aloof	from	many	of	
the	major	disagreements	within	the	Al	Qaeda	leadership.212	However,	his	charismatic	
appeal	over	the	organization	was	so	great	that	every	decision	was	made	on	the	basis	of	
what	Osama	would	want,	even	if	he	did	not	personally	speak	on	that	issue.	213	
For	the	different	branches	of	Al	Qaeda,	Bin	Laden’s	authority	was	key	to	tying	the	
organization	together.	As	will	be	explained	more	in	the	next	section,	Al	Qaeda	is	an	
umbrella	organization	that	is	comprised	of	many	different	regional	branches	that	owe	
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allegiance	to	a	central	leadership.214	Al	Qaeda	was	an	appealing	organization	for	regional	
Islamic	groups	to	join	because	the	authority	of	Bin	Laden	was	so	strong	that	regional	
groups	associated	with	Al	Qaeda	quickly	became	the	dominant	group	in	their	region.215	In	
exchange	for	the	renown	and	increased	authority	that	came	with	an	association	with	Bin	
Laden,	these	regional	groups	ceded	some	of	their	sovereignty	to	the	central	leadership	
organization.	Most	frequently,	after	joining	Al	Qaeda,	these	regional	Islamic	terror	groups	
would	change	focus	to	engage	in	international	terrorism	to	better	align	their	group	with	the	
goals	of	the	central	organization.216	In	this	way,	the	authority	of	Bin	Laden	served	as	the	
glue	that	bound	the	different	branches	of	Al	Qaeda	together	in	one	common	purpose.		
Given	how	important	charismatic	authority	was	to	the	structure	of	Al	Qaeda,	it	
would	be	logical	to	assume	that	leadership	removal	would	deeply	harm	the	organization’s	
ability	to	function.	However,	in	addition	to	Bin	Laden’s	exceptional	charisma,	he	also	had	an	
incredible	talent	for	organization.	In	Al	Qaeda,	he	built	an	institutional	and	hierarchical	
structure.	This	type	of	structure	has	the	features	necessary	to	be	resistant	to	leadership	
removal.		
Institutionalization	in	Al	Qaeda	
It	should	not	be	surprising	that	son	of	one	of	Saudi	Arabia’s	most	successful	
businessmen	and	a	former	economics	major	would	create	a	very	bureaucratic	organization.	
Bin	Laden	had	spent	his	whole	life	around,	or	running,	complex	organizations	and	that	
experience	showed	in	the	construction	of	Al	Qaeda.		
																																								 																					
214	Gunaratna	and	Oreg,	“Al	Qaeda’s	Organizational	Structure	and	its	Evolution,”	1051.	
215	Bergen,	Hoffman,	and	Tiedemann,	“Assessing	the	Jihadist	Terrorist	Threat	to	America	
and	American	Interest,”	73-76.		
216	Ibid,	73-76	
	 78	
Al	Qaeda	is	comprised	of	two	main	components,	the	center	and	the	branches.	The	
center	of	Al	Qaeda	includes	a	small	core	leadership	contingent	that	is	organized	into	a	very	
hierarchical	structure	(See	Fig.	1).217	At	the	top	of	this	structure	is	the	Amir,	the	overall	
leader	of	the	organization,	who	was	Bin	Laden.	The	Amir	is	the	ultimate	authority	in	the	
group	with	the	final	say	on	all	religious,	operational,	and	logistic	matters.	The	Amir	sets	the	
goals	and	provides	direction	for	the	entire	organization.218	Directly	below	the	Amir	is	the	
Secretary.	The	Secretary	is	responsible	for	turning	the	decrees	of	the	Amir	into	action.219	
This	is	a	managerial	position,	and	the	Secretary	is	not	supposed	to	replace	the	Amir.	
Around	the	time	of	the	death	of	Bin	Laden,	it	was	not	clear	if	the	secretary	position	was	
occupied	or	not.220		
The	second	highest	position	of	authority	in	the	organization	is	the	Deputy.	The	
Deputy	is	supposed	to	be	the	organizations	secondary	leader.	If	the	Amir	is	removed	during	
counter	terrorism	operations,	the	Deputy	would	become	the	new	Amir.221	The	Deputy	
should	hold	some	of	his	own	authority	within	Al	Qaeda	that	is	independent	of	the	authority	
of	the	Amir.222		
Below	the	deputy	is	the	Command	Council.	This	is	the	main	operational	unit	of	the	
Al	Qaeda	organization.	This	body	is	composed	of	7-10	high	level	Al	Qaeda	officials	who	
together	set	about	the	planning	and	execution	of	terrorist	attacks.223	The	Command	Council	
is	chaired	by	the	Amir	who	has	the	final	say	in	all	of	its	decision.	In	the	past,	the	other	
																																								 																					
217	Gunaratna	and	Oreg,	“Al	Qaeda’s	Organizational	Structure	and	its	Evolution,”	1055.	
218	Ibid,	1054.	
219	Ibid	,1056.	
220	Ibid,	1056.	
221	Ibid,	1055	
222	Gunaratna	and	Oreg,	“Al	Qaeda’s	Organizational	Structure	and	its	Evolution,”	1055.	
223	Ibid,	1056	
	 79	
members	of	the	Command	Council	have	included	the	head	of	finance,	head	of	security,	head	
of	general	section	military,	head	of	the	special	operations	unit,	head	theologian,	head	of	
media,	and	official	spokesman.224	
	
Figure	1	
Underneath	the	Command	Council,	the	organization	of	Al	Qaeda	breaks	down	into	
multiple,	specialized	units.	For	this	thesis,	the	most	important	of	these	units	is	the	Military	
Committee,	which	provides	the	resources	and	recruits	to	carry	out	the	Command	Council’s	
planned	attacks.225	One	wing	of	the	Military	Committee,	the	Military	Command	Special	
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Operations	Unit,	was	responsible	for	the	execution	of	all	of	Al	Qaeda’s	international	
terrorist	attacks.226		
This	central	leadership	structure	is	located	in	the	Afghanistan-Pakistan	border	
region	and	is	actually	a	fairly	small	part	of	the	organization’s	overall	size.227	The	bulk	of	Al	
Qaeda	membership	and	resources	comes	from	the	different	branches	of	Al	Qaeda	that	
pledge	loyalty	to	the	central	leadership.228		
The	branches	of	Al	Qaeda	are	a	diverse	set	of	regional	Islamic	terrorist	
organizations.	Some	of	the	most	notable	branches	of	Al	Qaeda	are	the	Abu	Sayaf	Group	
(ASG)	of	the	Philippines,	the	Islamic	Jihad	Union	of	Uzbekistan,	Al	Qaeda	in	the	Maghreb	
(AQIM),	which	operates	across	North	Africa,	Al	Shabab	in	Somalia,	Al	Qaeda	in	Iraq	(AQI),	
and	Al	Qaeda	in	the	Arabian	Peninsula	(AQAP).229	These	branches	give	the	Al	Qaeda	
organization	a	vast	international	reach	and	deep	reservoirs	of	capacity.		
The	relationship	between	the	center	of	Al	Qaeda	and	the	branches	is	symbiotic.	The	
center	provides	the	goals	and	guidance,	while	the	branches	provide	the	resources	to	carry	
out	the	goals	of	the	central	leadership.	This	can	be	seen	by	comparing	the	different	
branches	before	and	after	they	joined	Al	Qaeda.	Al	Shabab	was	a	regional	Islamist	group	
focused	on	attacking	the	decrepit	Somali	state	before	it	pledged	allegiance	to	Al	Qaeda.	
Soon	after	it	joined	up	with	Al	Qaeda	it	launched	a	series	of	devastating	bombings	in	
Uganda.230	These	attacks	showed	that	after	joining	Al	Qaeda,	Al	Shabab	had	not	only	gained	
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extended	reach	with	the	ability	to	attack	outside	of	the	borders	of	Somalia,	but	that	the	
organizational	capacity	of	Al	Shabab	had	also	improved	and	they	could	now	execute	
complicated	terrorist	attacks	that	required	extensive	training.	Through	their	alliance	Al	
Shabab	improved	its	capacity,	while	Al	Qaeda	central	leadership	gained	another	ally	
through	which	it	could	fight	the	far	enemy.		
This	same	process	is	seen	in	the	AQAP.	After	joining	Al	Qaeda,	AQAP	gained	
extended	reach	and	operational	abilities	that	quickly	made	it	the	most	deadly	branch	of	Al	
Qaeda.	AQAP	was	responsible	for	the	attempted	Detroit	airplane	bomber,	who	successfully	
snuck	an	explosive	device	through	airport	security	by	hiding	it	in	his	underwear.231	They	
were	also	accredited	in	the	Fort	Hood	and	Little	Rock	shootings	that	targeted	American	
servicemen	on	their	home	soil.232	The	multitude	of	branches	of	Al	Qaeda	poses	a	challenge	
for	the	effectiveness	of	leadership	removal,	since	it	makes	the	organization	a	multi-headed	
beast.		
The	incredible	sophistication	of	Al	Qaeda’s	institutional	structure	can	be	seen	in	the	
massive	paper	trail	of	the	organization.	Al	Qaeda	kept	detailed	records;	it	required	and	had	
extensive	recruitment	profiles	drawn	up	on	potential	members	of	the	organization	with	
key	areas	such	as	youth,	zealousness,	and	ability	to	obey	orders	highlighted	as	desirable	
traits.233	It	also	engaged	in	complicated	contracts	with	its	members	with	sections	on	salary,	
holiday,	travel	expenses,	rewards,	and	punishments.234	The	organization	had	its	own	daily	
and	weekly	new	publications	and	its	media	wing	was	particularly	active	in	the	creation	and	
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distribution	of	videos.235	Even	written	correspondence	between	the	leaders	and	branches	
of	Al	Qaeda	was	formatted	in	a	way	that	made	it	read	less	like	communications	between	
higher-ups	in	a	secretive	and	violent	organization	and	more	like	internal	memos	at	a	large	
multinational	firm.236		
The	institutional	nature	of	Al	Qaeda’s	organization	stands	in	sharp	contrast	to	its	
dependency	on	charismatic	authority	and	provides	a	challenge	to	predicting	the	outcome	of	
leadership	removal.	The	extent	and	importance	of	Bin	Laden’s	charismatic	authority	in	the	
organization	suggests	that	Al	Qaeda	would	be	susceptible	to	leadership	removal	while	the	
complex	institutional	framework	holding	up	Al	Qaeda’s	leadership	gives	one	reason	to	
think	leadership	removal	would	be	ineffective	against	Al	Qaeda.		
Analysis	of	Leadership	Removal	
Contrary	to	the	case	of	the	PKK,	the	killing	of	Bin	Laden	did	not	drastically	reduce	
the	lethality	of	Al	Qaeda.	In	fact,	2012	was	Al	Qaeda’s	most	deadly	year	in	a	long	time,	with	
more	deaths	than	the	previous	three	years	combined	(See	table	5).237	Based	on	this	data,	it	
appears	that	the	removal	of	Bin	Laden	created	a	more	violent	and	more	dangerous	
organization.	However,	the	raw	data	hides	very	interesting	regional	trends	and	masks	the	
damage	that	leadership	removal	did	to	the	organization.		
Firstly,	the	rise	in	lethality	in	Al	Qaeda	can	be	attributed	to	the	increased	activity	of	
Al	Qaeda	in	Iraq	and	to	a	much	greater	extent	the	AQAP.238	So	why	did	these	two	branches	
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of	Al	Qaeda	suddenly	become	much	more	lethal	after	the	death	of	Bin	Laden?	The	answer	
seems	to	lie	with	a	change	of	group	priorities.	As	mentioned	earlier,	one	of	the	key	
distinguishing	factors	between	Al	Qaeda	and	other	Islamic	terrorist	groups	was	Al	Qaeda’s	
commitment	to	launching	sophisticated	terrorist	attacks	against	the	West.239	The	emphasis	
on	the	far	enemy	meant	that	Al	Qaeda	prioritized	complex	terrorist	attacks	against	highly	
visible	Western	targets	as	opposed	to	a	multitude	of	attacks	against	softer	and	more	local	
targets.	However,	after	the	removal	of	Bin	Laden,	the	AQAP	seems	to	have	shifted	its	focus	
back	to	a	more	regional	terrorism,	with	the	goal	of	undermining	the	Yemeni	state.	Nearly	
all	of	the	AQAP’s	attacks	were	located	within	Yemen,	and	the	targets	typically	included	
police	stations	and	military	units,	signs	of	the	Yemeni	state,	as	opposed	to	Western	
targets.240				
The	data	on	the	AQAP’s	terrorist	activities	after	the	death	of	Bin	Laden	shows	that	
the	AQAP	faced	increasing	pressures	from	other	Islamist	groups.	In	addition	to	government	
troops,	multiple	AQAP	attacks	were	targeted	at	rival	terrorist	groups.241	The	death	of	Bin	
Laden	threatened	the	AQAP’s	status	as	the	premier	Islamic	terrorist	organization	on	the	
Arabian	peninsula,	so	the	organization	quickly	moved	to	eliminate	or	deter	regional	rival	
and	to	re-establish	its	supremacy	by	conducting	large,	visible	and	violent	terrorist	acts.	As	
the	most	powerful	group	of	Al	Qaeda,	the	AQAP’s	use	of	terror	to	reestablish	legitimacy	
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after	the	fall	of	Bin	Laden	proved	to	be	particularly	lethal.	The	AQAP’s	actions	provide	
evidence	for	Abrahms’	theory	that	leadership	removal	increases	violence	by	creating	a	
power	struggle	within	the	organization.242		
Al	Qaeda	Terrorist	Activity	2009-2014	
Year		 #	of	Attacks		 Killed		 Wounded		
2009	 65	 352	 492	
2010	 103	 445	 812	
2011	(before)	 28	 395	 359	
2011	(after)	 60	 350	 730	
2012	 522	 1,919	 3,447	
2013	 247	 795	 1,454	
2014	 315	 935	 885	
Table	5	
The	change	in	the	behavior	of	the	AQAP	is	important	because	it	shows	the	
importance	of	Bin	Laden’s	charismatic	authority	in	holding	the	branches	of	Al	Qaeda	
together.	Al	Qaeda	was	Bin	Laden’s	organization	and	he	provided	the	organization	with	a	
sense	of	direction.	The	different	branches	used	his	legitimacy	to	enhance	their	own	status	
and	power	and,	in	exchange,	they	helped	carry	out	Bin	Laden’s	plans.	The	problem	with	
this	system	was	it	put	the	authority	of	the	core	of	Al	Qaeda	into	one	man,	as	opposed	to	the	
office	of	the	Amir.	After	Bin	Laden	was	killed		a	new	Amir	was	named	and	assumed	the	
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head	of	the	organization.	However,	despite	the	best	efforts	of	the	organization,	the	new	
Amir	simply	did	not	have	the	type	of	charismatic	authority	that	Bin	Laden	had.	This	made	
the	center	of	Al	Qaeda	fairly	useless	to	its	different	branches,	so	local	leaders	took	the	
materials	and	experience	that	the	core	leadership	of	Al	Qaeda	had	provided	them	over	the	
years	and	used	them	to	pursue	their	own	goals.		
The	amount	of	authority	that	the	core	of	Al	Qaeda	lost	over	the	branches	can	be	seen	
in	the	center’s	response	to	the	AQAP	change	in	direction	after	the	death	of	Bin	Laden.	In	
2012,	the	infighting	within	AQAP,	as	different	local	leaders	scrambled	for	the	most	valuable	
piece	of	Al	Qaeda,	was	so	bad	that	the	core	of	Al	Qaeda	took	the	extraordinary	measure	of	
pleading	with	the	AQAP	in	open	publications	to	stop	fighting.243	A	terrorist	organization’s	
existence	is	based	on	its	ability	to	communicate	covertly,	and	the	fact	that	the	core	of	Al	
Qaeda	was	reduced	to	publicly	begging	one	of	its	branches	to	listen	to	it	shows	how	much	
authority	the	center	lost	with	the	death	of	Bin	Laden.			
	 Just	like	the	AQAP,	Al	Qaeda	in	Iraq	also	became	more	violent	and	regional	after	the	
death	of	Bin	Laden	in	order	to	re-establish	it	primacy.	However,	unlike	the	AQAP,	Al	Qaeda	
in	Iraq	failed	to	compete	with	its	regional	rivals	and	has	faded	into	obscurity.	The	group	
has	not	launched	a	terrorist	attack	since	2013	despite	the	fact	that	2012	was	the	group’s	
most	violent	year	(see	table	6).244	The	members	and	leader	of	Al	Qaeda	in	Iraq	did	not	
simply	give	up	and	go	home,	though.	Instead,	they	gave	up	their	association	with	Al	Qaeda	
to	join	a	new	terrorist	group	called	the	Islamic	State	in	Iraq	and	Syria	(ISIS).	The	members	
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who	tired	to	remain	loyal	to	Al	Qaeda	found	that,	without	the	appeal	of	Bin	Laden,	they	
simply	could	not	compete	with	their	newer	regional	rival.		
Al	Qaeda	in	Iraq		
Year		 #	of	Attacks		 Killed		 Wounded		
2009	 19	 161	 382	
2010	 33	 163	 623	
2011	(before	
removal)	
3	 158	 245	
2011	(after	
removal)	
27	 153	 401	
2012	 120	 430	 947	
2013	 77	 347	 814	
2014	 0	 0	 0	
Table	6	
	 While	the	most	sophisticated	and	well	equipped	branches	of	Al	Qaeda	became	more	
lethal	after	the	death	of	Bin	Laden,	some	of	the	smaller	branches	that	lacked	much	of	the	
critical	infrastructure	of	AQAP	and	Al	Qaeda	in	Iraq	suffered	a	decrease	in	operational	
capacity	immediately	following	leadership	removal.	AQIM	terrorist	activity	dropped	
significantly	after	the	removal	of	Bin	Laden,	with	2012	being	its	least	active	year.	However,	
by	2013,	the	organization’s	rate	of	terrorist	activity	and	lethality	returned	to	around	its	
average	(see	Table	7).	
	 The	IJU	also	appears	to	have	suffered	from	the	loss	of	Bin	Laden.	While	the	Uzbek	
group	had	always	been	a	smaller	branch	of	Al	Qaeda,	there	was	significant	evidence	that	
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suggested	that	by	2010,	the	group	was	becoming	more	involved	in	the	perpetration	of	
terrorist	attacks	planned	by	Al	Qaeda’s	core	leadership.	The	organization	started	to	receive	
a	large	contingent	of	foreign	fighters	particularly	from	Germany,	and	even	launched	a	failed	
terrorist	attack	against	the	Ramstein	Airforce	Base	in	Germany.245	Since	the	removal	of	Bin	
Laden,	however,	the	organization	has	not	been	heavily	involved	with	international	
terrorism.		
AQIM	Terrorist	Activity		
Year	 Attacks		 Deaths		 Wounded		
2009	 32	 154	 75	
2010	 17	 41	 74	
2011	(before)	 10	 41	 44	
2011	(after)	 9	 6	 13	
2012	 12	 9	 22	
2013	 18	 48	 50	
2014	 17	 45	 48	
Table	7	
	 The	experiences	of	the	more	peripheral	branches	of	Al	Qaeda	confirm	the	trends	
seen	in	AQAP	and	Al	Qaeda	in	Iraq.	The	removal	of	Bin	Laden	decayed	the	authority	of	Al	
Qaeda’s	core	leadership	and	forced	a	return	to	regionalism	in	the	branches	of	Al	Qaeda.	
However,	unlike	the	stronger	branch	of	Al	Qaeda,	the	periphery	branches	experienced	a	
loss	of	capacity	after	the	death	of	Bin	Laden,	since	they	had	weak	institutional	structures	
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and	they	were	more	negatively	impacted	by	leadership	removal	than	AQAP	or	Al	Qaeda	in	
Iraq.		
	 Given	the	mixed	effects	of	the	death	of	Bin	Laden	on	the	operational	capacity	of	Al	
Qaeda	it	is	difficult	to	assess	how	effective	leadership	removal	was	as	a	counterterrorism	
strategy.	On	the	one	hand,	leadership	removal	did	not	lead	to	organizational	collapse	or	the	
halting	of	terrorist	activities	by	Al	Qaeda,	as	in	the	case	of	the	PKK,	and	for	citizens	of	
Yemen,	the	death	of	Bin	Laden	certainly	left	them	worse	off.	On	the	other	hand,	it	cannot	be	
said	that	the	death	of	Bin	Laden	did	not	have	an	effect	on	Al	Qaeda.	The	death	of	Bin	Laden	
fundamentally	altered	Al	Qaeda.	The	core	of	the	organization	lost	much	of	its	authority	over	
its	branches	and	has	become	significantly	less	relevant	to	the	organization.	The	branches	of	
Al	Qaeda	that	are	left	seem	much	less	fixated	on	Bin	Laden’s	strategy	of	targeting	the	far	
enemy.	From	the	perspective	of	the	American	defense	establishment,	this	could	be	a	
counterterrorism	win	since	the	death	of	Bin	Laden	shifted	the	focus	of	the	organization	
away	from	targeting	American	citizens.	However,	the	increased	violence	of	the	branches	of	
Al	Qaeda	poses	a	risk	to	the	stability	of	the	region	and	there	is	no	guarantee	that	these	
branches	will	not	choose	to	adopt	international	terrorism	as	their	main	strategy	later.	
Additionally,	some	of	the	renegade	branches	of	Al	Qaeda	spun	off	into	regional	terrorist	
organizations	that	still	gave	the	security	establishment	a	headache.		
	 While	it	is	hard	to	weigh	the	cost	and	benefits	of	leadership	removal,	the	case	of	Al	
Qaeda	does	do	a	good	job	in	illustrating	how	high	levels	of	charismatic	authority	and	
institutionalization	interact	within	a	terrorist	organization.	Once	again,	institutionalization	
in	an	organization	with	a	highly	charismatic	leader,	served	to	expand	the	authority	of	the	
charismatic	leader	instead	of	the	office	of	the	leader,	over	the	organization.	The	highly	
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institutionalized	nature	of	Al	Qaeda	was	simply	a	support	mechanism	to	turn	the	will	of	
Osama	Bin	Laden	into	action.	When	Bin	Laden	was	killed,	the	hierarchical	Al	Qaeda	core	
lost	legitimacy.	The	organization	that	perpetrated	the	September	11th	attacks	died	with	Al	
Qaeda.	The	organization	that	emerged	after	the	death	of	Bin	Laden	took	advantage	of	the	
infrastructure	that	was	in	place	to	create	new	groups.	High	levels	of	institutionalization	in	
Al	Qaeda	did	not	allow	the	organization	to	survive	leadership	removal	unchanged,	but	it	
did	allow	the	organization	to	keep	its	operational	capacity	and	evolve	into	something	new.		
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Conclusion 
	
	
	 In	terrorist	organizations	with	high	levels	of	charismatic	authority	and	
institutionalization,	leadership	removal	does	not	degrade	their	operational	capacity.	The	
institutional	structures	within	the	terrorist	group	ensure	that	leadership	removal	does	not	
result	in	organizational	collapse,	and	the	organization	can	continue	to	function.	However,	
the	loss	of	charismatic	authority	within	highly	institutionalized	terrorist	organizations	has	
a	significant	impact	on	the	goals	and	direction	of	a	terrorist	group.	The	loss	of	charismatic	
authority	from	leadership	removal	threatens	a	terrorist	group’s	legitimacy	forcing	political	
change	within	the	organization	and	these	changes	can	have	positive	counterterrorism	
implications.		
	 The	positive	impact	of	these	changes	is	most	clearly	seen	through	the	case	of	the	
PKK.	After	the	removal	of	Öcalan,	the	strategy	that	the	PKK	used	to	accomplish	their	
political	goals	changed	overnight	from	one	of	insurgent	violence	with	a	heavy	emphasis	on	
terrorist	attacks	to	political	negotiations	with	the	Turkish	state.	The	change	in	the	PKK’s	
tactics	was	immensely	beneficial	to	the	Turkish	state	as	violent	attacks	by	the	PKK	against	
the	Turkish	state	fell	to	essentially	zero,	relieving	pressure	on	the	Turkish	government.	As	
noted	in	the	chapter,	though,	even	though	the	tactics	of	the	PKK	changed	in	a	way	that	was	
beneficial	to	the	Turkish	state,	the	potential	of	the	organization	to	launch	terrorist	attacks	
against	the	Turkish	state	was	unhindered	by	leadership	removal.	After	the	breakdown	of	
political	negotiations	with	the	Turkish	state,	the	PKK	returned	to	the	use	of	terrorism.	To	
this	day,	the	PKK	remains	one	of	the	Turkish	state’s	greatest	threats.	While	leadership	
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removal	provided	a	chance	at	a	political	solution	to	the	conflict	between	Turkey	and	the	
PKK,	it	was	not	effective	as	a	military	strategy	that	could	defeat	the	PKK.		
	 Additionally,	while	leadership	removal	in	highly	charismatic	and	institutionalized	
organizations	can	provide	positive	counterterrorism	outcomes,	it	can	also	yield	outcomes	
that	make	the	organization	more	dangerous.	This	was	seen	in	the	case	of	Al	Qaeda,	in	which	
the	loss	of	Osama	Bin	Laden’s	charismatic	authority	made	some	of	the	different	regional	
branches	of	Al	Qaeda	significantly	more	lethal	as	they	attempted	to	reassert	their	
legitimacy	in	their	respective	regions.	For	the	countries	that	had	active	Al	Qaeda	branches	
operating	within	them,	leadership	removal	was	certainly	a	negative	development.	While	
the	removal	of	Osama	Bin	Laden	could	be	argued	as	a	positive	development	for	the	United	
States,	since	it	reduced	the	organization’s	focus	on	fighting	the	far	enemy,	it	also	created	
new	headaches	for	the	defense	establishment	since	the	more	active	Al	Qaeda	regional	
branches	threaten	state	stability	across	the	Middle	East.	The	United	States’	
counterterrorism	policy	had	to	adapt	accordingly	to	this	change	in	the	nature	of	Al	Qaeda.	
After	2011,	the	number	of	U.S.	drone	attacks	in	Yemen	rose	drastically,	as	the	U.S.	
attempted	to	counter	a	more	active	AQAP.246	At	best,	the	removal	of	Osama	Bin	Laden	had	a	
mixed	impact	on	the	security	of	the	United	States.		
	 Given	that	the	effects	of	leadership	removal	in	terrorist	organizations	with	high	
levels	of	charismatic	authority	and	institutionalizations	can	be	mixed,	when	should	
governments	pursue	leadership	removal	against	these	organizations?	Governments	should	
use	and	view	leadership	removal	as	a	tool	to	modify	the	tactics	and	goals	of	terrorist	
																																								 																					
246	“Drone	Strikes:	Yemen.”	New	America.	Accessed	March	27,	2018.	
https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/americas-counterterrorism-wars/us-targeted-
killing-program-yemen/		
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organizations.	Unfortunately	for	governments,	how	exactly	leadership	removal	will	modify	
the	goals	and	tactics	of	a	terrorist	organization	depends	heavily	on	intergroup	dynamics	
that	are	not	usually	transparent	to	governments.	For	example,	one	of	the	hopes	of	Israeli	
military	planners	when	they	gave	the	order	to	assassinate	Yassin	was	that	Hamas	might	not	
pursue	suicide	bombing	as	a	strategy	under	a	different	leader.247	However,	the	dynamic	
within	Hamas	empowered	more	radical	leaders	after	the	death	of	Yassin	and	suicide	
bombings	continued.		
	 To	understand	how	leadership	removal	impacts	the	goals	of	a	terrorist	organization,	
it	is	important	to	understand	the	sources	of	legitimacy	within	that	terrorist	group.	The	
greatest	strength	of	leadership	removal	is	not	it	ability	to	degrade	the	operational	capacity	
of	a	terrorist	organization	but	rather	its	ability	to	challenge	the	legitimacy	of	that	
organization.	To	evaluate	the	impact	of	leadership	removal	it	is	essential	to	think	about	
how	the	organization	will	work	to	restore	its	legitimacy.	The	death	of	Osama	Bin	Laden	
made	the	branches	of	Al	Qaeda	more	violent	within	their	regions	to	re-establish	their	
legitimacy.	Öcalan	was	so	successful	at	consolidating	charismatic	authority	behind	himself	
through	his	hierarchical	structure	that	even	while	captured	by	the	Turkish	state	he	
commanded	enough	authority	within	the	PKK	to	demand	that	it	declare	a	ceasefire	and	
start	political	negotiations.	By	looking	to	sources	of	legitimacy,	the	potential	impacts	of	
leadership	removal	on	an	organization	can	be	evaluated.		
Evaluating	Potential	Effects	of	Leadership	Removal	on	Contemporary	Groups	
	 How	effective	then	would	leadership	removal	be	against	a	contemporary	terrorist	
organization	such	as	ISIS?	It	would	not	be	that	effective.	ISIS	is	not	an	organization	that	
																																								 																					
247	Gazir	and	Brym,	“State-directed	political	assassinations	in	Israel,”	867-869.	
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draws	it	legitimacy	from	its	leader.	Bagdadhi	is	a	charismatic	leader	without	a	doubt,	but	
the	true	source	of	ISIS’	authority	comes	from	its	possession	of	territory,	which	justifies	its	
claim	to	be	the	new	caliphate.248	Since	ISIS	is	also	a	well-organized	and	institutionalized	
organization,	during	its	heyday	it	basically	functioned	as	a	state	in	the	territory	it	
controlled,	leadership	removal	could	be	resisted	without	an	altering	of	the	organization’s	
goals	or	tactics.249	However,	the	U.S.	policy	of	helping	local	forces	reclaim	territory	from	
ISIS	poses	a	great	challenge	to	the	organization’s	legitimacy,	not	to	mention	its	operation	
capacity	as	well,	since	unlike	leadership	removal,	the	reclaiming	of	territory	was	
accompanied	by	combat	that	resulted	in	substantial	losses	across	all	levels	of	ISIS’	
organization.	By	the	time	of	this	writing,	US	coalition	forces	had	reclaimed	nearly	all	the	
territory	that	ISIS	once	controlled.	This	development	will	force	ISIS	to	turn	to	other	sources	
of	legitimacy.		
	 I	predict	that	similar	to	the	Al	Qaeda	case,	the	loss	of	the	main	source	of	legitimacy	
will	cause	ISIS	members	to	turn	to	regional	terrorism.	ISIS	brought	thousands	of	foreign	
fighters	to	its	caliphate	to	carry	out	attacks	in	Syria	and	Iraq.250	Now	that	the	caliphate	is	
dead,	these	foreign	fighters	will	most	likely	try	to	return	to	their	home	countries.	Some	of	
these	fighters	will	give	up	terrorist	violence,	but	a	few	will	use	the	skills	they	learned	in	
Syria	and	Iraq	to	conduct	acts	of	terrorism	in	their	home	countries	using	ISIS’	name	in	a	bid	
to	make	the	organization	stay	relevant.	This	is	similar	to	how	the	branches	of	Al	Qaeda	
became	more	dangerous	after	the	death	of	Osama	Bin	Laden.	However,	the	main	difference	
between	Al	Qaeda	and	ISIS	is	that	Al	Qaeda	already	had	a	regional	infrastructure	in	place	
																																								 																					
248	Gerges,	Fawaz,	ISIS:	A	History,	(University	of	Princeton	Press:	2016)	222-228.	
249Ibid,	1-6.		
250	Ibid,	1-6.	
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that	allowed	the	branches	of	Al	Qaeda	to	operate	effectively.	ISIS	has	no	regional	
infrastructure	in	place	so	the	new	ISIS	will	be	a	decentralized,	leaderless	organization	that	
will	carry	out	lone	wolf	style	attacks	in	ISIS’	name.	These	attacks	will	probably	be	
significantly	less	lethal	than	the	attacks	that	the	organization	undertook	in	Syria	and	Iraq	
but	could	be	more	politically	important	in	the	counties	where	they	occur.		
	 The	ISIS	case	illustrates	how	the	logic	used	to	evaluate	the	impacts	of	leadership	
removal	can	be	applied	to	other	counterterrorism	developments.	Even	though	leadership	
removal	would	not	be	effective	against	ISIS	since	the	authority	of	the	organization	does	not	
come	from	its	leader,	thinking	through	the	effects	of	challenging	the	legitimacy	of	ISIS	
provides	insights	into	how	the	organization	will	evolve	from	the	U.S.	effort	to	take	its	
territory.		
	 With	the	massive	caveat	that	a	terrorist	organization	is	not	a	state,	the	results	of	
leadership	removal,	particularly	on	highly	charismatic	and	institutionalized	terrorist	
organizations,	since	they	most	closely	resemble	states,	could	be	used	to	evaluate	the	
impacts	using	leadership	removal	on	a	head	of	state.	This	is	particularly	relevant	since	the	
taboo	on	the	use	of	leadership	removal	as	a	strategy	in	state	conflict	has	recently	
weakened.	The	South	Korea	government	recently	created	a	special	decapitation	unit,	
whose	sole	function	is	to	eliminate	the	North	Korean	leadership	in	event	of	a	conflict	
between	the	two	states.251		
	 The	North	Korean	State	is	both	highly	institutionalized	and	utterly	dependent	on	
charismatic	authority	so	leadership	removal	would	challenge	the	authority	of	the	state	and	
																																								 																					
251	Choe	Sang-Hun	“South	Korea	Plans	‘Decapitation	Unit’	to	Try	to	Scare	North’s	Leaders.”	
The	New	York	Times,	September	12th,	2017.	
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/world/asia/north-south-korea-decapitation-
.html			
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force	changes	in	state	behavior.	However,	I	would	never	recommend	leadership	removal	as	
a	solution	to	the	Korean	crisis	because	the	chance	that	what	happens	as	a	result	being	far	
worse	than	the	status	quo	are	unconscionably	high.	It	is	possible	that	after	leadership	
removal	the	new	leader	of	North	Korea	adopts	a	more	conciliatory	tone	toward	South	
Korea	and	is	less	committed	to	the	North’s	nuclear	program,	but	it	is	far	more	likely	that	
local	leaders	decide	the	best	way	to	increase	their	own	legitimacy	and	power	after	
leadership	removal	is	through	massive	and	lethal	retaliation	against	the	South.	Leadership	
removal	is	simply	too	risky	of	a	strategy	to	use	against	states,	let	alone	nuclear-armed	ones.				
Areas	for	Further	Research	
	 One	area	not	addressed	within	this	thesis	is	the	effect	of	capturing	leaders	instead	of	
killing	them.	With	the	caveat	that	I	have	not	extensively	researched	the	issue,	I	would	
predict	that	it	is	always	preferable	to	capture	charismatic	terrorist	leaders	as	opposed	to	
killing	them.	This	is	because	a	captured	terrorist	leader	poses	a	much	bigger	debacle	to	an	
organization	dependent	on	charismatic	authority	than	a	dead	one.	While	a	dead	leader	
forces	the	organization	to	re-establish	its	legitimacy	through	other	means,	a	captured	
leader	will	typically	still	hold	authority	within	their	organization	and	can	use	that	authority	
to	modify	the	goals	of	the	organization	in	a	more	controlled	fashion.	This	is	certainly	what	
Öcalan	did	after	he	was	captured	by	the	Turkish	state.	If	Turkey	had	killed	him	instead	of	
capturing	him	it	is	unlikely	that	the	PKK	would	have	agreed	to	the	cease-fire.	The	authority	
that	Öcalan	has	over	his	organization	may	be	the	reason	that	the	Turkish	state	continues	to	
delay	his	execution.		In	addition	to	the	two	examples	in	this	thesis,	in	which	captured	
leaders	led	to	positive	counterterrorism	policy	outcomes,	the	capture	of	Guzman	of	the	
Shining	Path	and	Auginaldo	of	the	Philippines	also	led	to	their	respective	organizations’	
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collapse.	The	effects	of	leadership	removal	are	often	messy	and	rarely	controlled,	but	a	
captured	leader	provides	the	opportunity	to	exert	a	little	control	over	the	process.		
Final	Thoughts	
	 Leadership	removal	has	been	treated	as	a	default	strategy	in	counterterrorism	for	
far	too	long.	It	certainly	has	its	place	in	the	counterterrorism	policy	world	as	it	is	
remarkably	effective	against	organizations	with	high	levels	of	charismatic	authority	and	
low	levels	of	institutionalization,	but	its	effects	are	far	to	varied	to	be	applied	as	a	blunt	
instrument.	Instead,	leadership	removal	needs	to	looked	at	for	what	it	is:	a	relatively	
uncontrolled	method	through	which	states	can	alter	the	goals	and	tactics	of	terrorist	
organizations.	The	employment	of	leadership	removal	should	be	limited	and	done	on	a	
case-by-case	basis,	in	which	the	internal	dynamics	of	a	terrorist	organization	are	first	
evaluated	to	determine	that	leadership	removal	can	yield	a	positive	outcome.		
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Appendix 
	
David	Hoffman’s	scale	of	Charismatic	Authority252	
1. Is	the	authority	of	the	leader	interpreted	in	terms	of	ingrained	and	traditional	
conceptions	of	charismatic	authority	in	the	broader	society	and	culture?	
2. Is	authority	attributed	to	the	leaders	on	the	basis	of	the	perception	that	there	is	an	
impending	or	current	crisis,	one	associated	with	the	bankruptcy	of	existing	forms	of	
traditional	and/or	rational-legal	forms	of	authority?	
3. Are	attributions	of	power	to	the	leader	based	on	the	follower’s	perception	of	the	
leader’s	superhuman	and/or	exceptional	powers	and	qualities?	
4. Is	the	authority	attributed	to	the	leader	associated	with	any	physical	impairment	or	
suffering	viewed	positively	by	the	followers?		
5. Does	the	leader	legitimate	their	authority	through	reference	to	a	higher	source	of	
authority,	either	divine	or	some	other	transcendent	source	(i.e.	a	supreme	
ideology)?		
6. Are	grandiose	and	exaggerated	claims	made	about	the	nature	and	scope	of	the	
leader’s	authority	and	importance?		
7. Are	new	members	socialized	into	recognizing	the	special	powers	and	authority	of	
the	leader?	
8. Does	the	leader	figure	prominently	in	the	folklore	of	the	group	and	the	
representation	of	its	“story”?	
9. Are	the	organization’s	decisions	highly	centralized	and	reliant	on	the	will	of	the	
leader?		
																																								 																					
252	Hoffman,	“Quantifying	and	Qualifying	Charisma,”	716-717.	
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10. Is	the	leader	intolerant	of	alternative	sources	of	power	and	authority,	both	internal	
and	external	to	the	group?		
11. Does	the	leader	introduce	sudden	and/or	seemingly	arbitrary	changes	in	the	
practices	and	policies	of	the	group?	
12. Do	followers	readily	accept	these	sudden	and/or	seemingly	arbitrary	changes	in	the	
practices	and	policies	of	the	group?	
13. Is	the	delegation	of	authority	highly	centralized	and	reliant	on	the	will	of	the	leader?	
14. Does	the	legitimacy	of	subordinate	leaders	in	the	group	depend	on	the	nature	of	
their	personal	relationship	with	the	leader?		
Charismatic	Authority	of	Shoko	Asahara253	
1.	Yes.	This	criteria	is	easily	fulfilled	by	Shoko	Asahara.	Shoko	Asahara	was	
completely	blind	in	one	eye	and	partially	blind	in	the	other.	He	used	disability	to	
substantiate	his	claim	that	his	vision	was	not	like	that	of	ordinary	men	but	divine	in	its	
nature.	This	allowed	him	to	see	into	the	future	and	determine	what	the	divine	plan	for	the	
world	was	and	how	his	followers	could	achieve	enlightenment.	Members	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	
believed	that	Shoko	Asahara	occupied	a	higher	dimensional	existence,	making	him	the	solo	
individual	who	could	provide	spiritual	fulfillment.		
2.	Sort	of.	This	might	be	the	weakest	aspect	of	Shoko	Asahara’s	charismatic	
authority,	but	there	are	clear	efforts	on	his	part	to	ground	his	own	charismatic	authority	in	
more	traditional	conceptions	of	charismatic	authority.	For	example,	Shoko	Asahara	
barrowed	heavily	from	Buddhist	practices	and	even	claimed	he	was	the	first	enlightened	
																																								 																					
253	Information	to	complete	the	scale	was	compiled	from	Mark	Juergensmeyer	Terror	in	the	Mind	
of	God,	(University	of	California	Press:	2003)	103-120.	
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one	to	be	born	on	earth	since	Buddha	himself.	This	practice	allowed	Shoko	Asahara	to	
coopt	the	authority	of	Buddhism,	which	was	very	popular	in	Japanese	culture	to	grant	his	
organization	more	legitimacy.		
3.	Yes.	Shoko	Asahara	was	brilliant	at	exploited	disillusionment	among	individuals	
to	increase	his	own	authority	over	his	members.	The	time	when	Aum	Shinrikyo	
membership	was	most	actively	growing	was	also	during	an	economic	boom	in	Japan.	While	
this	rapid	economic	growth	brought	many	benefits	to	Japan,	it	also	prompted	vast	cultural	
change	that	left	many	young	Japanese	people	disillusioned.	The	pressure	of	the	economic	
rat	race	and	the	rapid	Westernization	of	Japan	sent	many	young	looking	for	spiritual	
fulfillment.	Shoko	Asahara	told	them	exactly	what	they	wanted	to	hear;	that	they	were	right	
to	be	disillusioned	because	Japanese	society	was	morally	bankrupt	and	this	corrupt	society	
would	soon	collapse.		
4.	Yes.	This	criteria	fits	perfectly	to	Shoko	Asahara.	Again,	Shoko	Asahara	was	half-
blind	but	he	turned	his	disability	into	a	key	aspect	of	his	cult-of-personality.	This	skill	came	
from	an	early	start	using	his	half-blindness	to	his	advantage.	As	a	child,	he	had	been	sent	to	
an	all	blind	school,	where	his	partial	vision	gave	him	an	advantage	over	his	peers	and	made	
him	a	natural	leader.	He	built	his	leadership	skills	as	a	child	using	his	gift	of	limited	vision	
to	manipulate	his	classmates.		
5.	Yes.	As	stated	earlier,	Shoko	Asahara	barrowed	heavily	from	traditional	Buddhist	
practices	creating	an	easy	association	between	himself	and	the	authority	of	Buddha.		
6.		Yes.	The	whole	basis	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	was	that	Shoko	Asahara	was	unique	
among	men	and	only	he	could	successfully	guide	people	to	enlightenment.	Many	of	the	
claims	made	about	Shoko	Asahara	such	as	the	claim	that	he	occupied	a	higher	dimensional	
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existence	that	allowed	him	to	see	into	the	future	or	the	claim	that	on	a	trip	to	Nepal	he	was	
personally	entrusted	with	a	secret	mission	from	the	Dalai	Lama	himself	are	clearly	
exaggerated	to	stress	his	importance	and	authority.		
7.		Yes.	Aum	Shinrikyo	had	very	bizarre	socialization	processes	to	get	new	members	
to	believe	in	the	special	powers	and	authority	of	Shoko	Asahara.	In	one	such	ritual,	recruits	
would	be	placed	on	lightly	vibrating	mats	and	be	given	a	tea	that	caused	them	to	
hallucinate	(it	is	suspected	that	the	tea	was	laced	with	LSD).	During	these	hallucinations	
the	recruits	were	told	to	think	of	Shoko	Asahara	because	only	through	him	could	they	avoid	
bad	visions	and	find	the	truth.	
8.	Yes.	For	Aum	Shinrikyo,	their	story	is	completely	dependent	on	Shoko	Asahara.	
Shoko	Asahara	was	the	only	member	of	the	organization	to	receive	divine	messages,	so	
only	he	could	fulfill	the	organization’s	goals.	Shoko	Asahara	purposely	designed	the	Aum	
Shinrikyo	founding	myth	with	himself	at	the	center.		
9.	Yes.	Aum	Shinrikyo	was	incredibly	centralized.	Shoko	Asahara	was	the	sole	
individual	responsible	for	the	direction	and	decisions	of	the	organization.	Everything	
produced	by	the	organization	was	designed	to	increase	Shoko	Asahara	‘sauthority	within	it.	
For	example,	all	of	Aum	Shinrikyo’s	advertising	publications	heavily	featured	Shoko	
Asahara	and	his	spiritual	wisdom.	The	goal	of	the	recruitment	process	was	to	attract	people	
who	already	felt	close	to	Shoko	Asahara	as	opposed	to	the	organization	at	large.	
10.	Yes.	Shoko	Asahara	always	tried	to	eliminate	opposing	sources	of	authority	both	
within	and	outside	of	Aum	Shinrikyo.	The	first	targets	of	Aum	Shinrikyo’s	terrorist	
activities	were	not	ordinary	citizens	of	Japan	but	fellow	members	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	who	
posed	a	challenge	to	Shoko	Asahara’s	authority.	Once	he	had	consolidated	his	authority	
	 105	
within	Aum	Shinrikyo,	Shoko	Asahara	moved	to	eliminate	his	main	rival	in	external	
authority,	the	Japanese	government.	He	first	attempted	to	do	this	through	elections,	but	
after	the	Aum	Shinrikyo	political	party	failed	to	win	in	parliamentary	elections,	Shoko	
Asahara	sought	to	undermine	the	authority	of	the	Japanese	government	through	terrorism.		
11.		Yes.	Shoko	Asahara	quite	frequently	changed	the	religious	practices	of	Aum	
Shinrikyo.	One	of	the	largest	and	most	dramatic	changes	he	made	to	the	organization	was	
the	introduction	of	“poa”,	which	marked	a	transition	of	the	religion	towards	violent	
fanaticism.		
12.		Yes,.Despite	Shoko	Asahara’s	frequent	changes	to	the	vision	of	Aum	Shinrikyo,	
the	religion	continued	to	grow	and	pick	up	new	members.	By	the	time	of	the	Tokyo	subway	
attack,	the	group	held	over	40,000	members.	The	lack	of	an	exodus	from	the	organization	
during	major	changes	to	its	religious	philosophy	highlights	just	how	strong	Shoko	
Asahara’s	charismatic	appeal	in	Aum	Shinrikyo	was.		
13.		Yes.		All	of	the	top	positions	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	were	filled	by	members	who	had	
close	personal	relationships	with	Shoko	Asahara	and	deeply	believed	in	his	divine	nature.	
Shoko	Asahara	was	so	effective	in	centralizing	his	authority	that	after	he	was	captured,	the	
secondary	leaders	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	found	their	authority	over	individual	members	of	Aum	
Shinrikyo	deeply	degraded.	To	counteract	this,	some	secondary	leaders	isolated	members	
of	Aum	Shinrikyo	from	the	news	that	Shoko	Asahara	had	been	arrested	because	they	knew	
if	the	rank	and	file	found	out	they	would	lose	their	authority.		
	 14.	Yes.	As	said	in	criteria	13,	all	of	the	top	leaders	of	Aum	Shinrikyo	held	close	
personal	relationships	with	Shoko	Asahara.	This	cemented	Shoko	Asahara’s	authority	at	
the	top	of	Aum	Shinrikyo.	
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Charismatic	Authority	of	Ahmed	Yassin254	
1. Yes.	Yassin	drew	heavily	from	traditional	notions	of	Islamic	authority	to	enhance	his	
own	standing	within	Hamas.		
2. Yes.	The	presence	of	Israel	and	the	loss	of	Palestinian	land	was	used	as	a	
justification	for	Yassin’s	authority.		
3. Yes.	Among	the	followers	of	Hamas	there	was	a	feeling	that	Yassin	was	unnaturally	
wise.		
4. Yes.	Yassin	was	paralyzed	from	the	waist	down	and	had	been	since	he	was	sixteen,	
but	he	used	this	physical	impairment	to	enhance	his	own	cult-of-authority.		
5. Yes.	As	mentioned	earlier,	Yassin	drew	heavily	from	the	traditional	authority	of	
Islam	by	living	very	piously	and	modestly.		
6. Yes.	He	was	given	the	title	of	the	spiritual	leader	of	Hamas	and	he	was	considered	
essential	to	the	organization.		
7. No.	Although	Yassin	was	recognized	as	a	leader	of	Hamas	and	beloved	for	his	
spiritual	wisdom,	there	was	not	a	method	through	which	individual	recruits	were	
socialized	to	his	authority.		
																																								 																					
254	Information	for	scale	compiled	from	Matthew	Levitt	“Hamas:	politics,	charity,	and	
terrorism	in	the	service	of	Jihad,”	(Yale	University	Press:	2006),	34-37.	And	Khaled	Hroub	
“Hamas	after	Shaykh	Yasin	and	Rantisi,”	Journal	of	Palestinian	Studies,	Vol.	33	No.	4,	
Summer	2004,	21-38.		
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8. Yes.	He	did	feature	very	proximately	in	the	story	of	Hamas.	However,	he	was	not	the	
only	figure	to	do	so,	and	he	did	not	attempt	to	rewrite	the	story	of	Hamas	to	just	be	
centered	around	himself.		
9. No.	Hamas	is	a	networked	organization	and,	at	the	local	level,	the	authority	of	the	
central	leadership	was	significantly	less	important	than	the	will	and	connections	of	
the	local	leader.		
10. No.	There	was	a	wide	variety	of	other	sources	of	authority	within	Hamas	that	Yassin	
tolerated.	Even	within	the	central	leadership,	Yassin	competed	with	other	leaders.		
11. No,	Although	Hamas	would	change	its	positions	on	issues,	decisions	were	reached	
through	consensus	within	the	organization’s	leadership	rather	than	the	arbitrary	
will	of	one	leader.		
12. No.	
13. No.	Again	the	structure	of	Hamas	was	really	focused	on	consensus	building	as	
opposed	to	centralization.		
14. No.	It	was	more	important	for	leaders	to	have	a	network	within	their	community	
than	it	was	for	them	to	have	a	strong	personal	relationship	with	the	central	
leadership.				
Charismatic	Authority	of	Abdullah	Öcalan255	
1. Yes.	Öcalan’s	authority	was	derived	from	Kurdish	culture	and	he	established	his	
organization	to	take	advantage	of	these	ideas.		
																																								 																					
255	Information	for	this	scale	compiled	from	Özlem	Pusane	“Turkey’s	Military	Victory	over	
the	PKK	and	its	Failure	to	End	the	PKK	Insurgency.”	Middle	Eastern	Studies,	Vol.	51,	No.	5,	
2015,	727-741.	
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2. Yes.	Öcalan’s	organization	effectively	used	the	repression	of	the	Kurdish	people	by	
the	Turkish	government	and	the	desire	of	the	Kurdish	people	for	a	Kurdish	state	to	
enhance	his	own	authority.		
3. Yes.	Öcalan	was	not	simply	the	leader	of	a	liberation	movement;	he	became	the	idea	
of	Kurdish	liberation	for	many	of	the	followers	of	the	PKK.	He	was	viewed	as	the	
father	of	the	modern	Kurdish	nation.		
4. No.	
5. Yes.	Öcalan	borrowed	heavily	from	the	ideas	of	nationhood	and	nationalism	to	
enhance	his	own	authority	within	the	PKK.		
6. Yes.	As	mentioned	earlier,	Öcalan	came	to	be	viewed	as	the	father	of	the	Kurdish	
nation	and	was	viewed	as	a	messiah	figure.		
7. Sort	of.	There	was	less	of	an	emphasis	on	recognizing	the	special	powers	of	Öcalan	
but	the	PKK	was	very	picky	when	it	came	to	recruiting	fighters.	One	of	its	criteria	for	
fighters	was	how	deferential	they	were	to	authority.		
8. Yes.	Öcalan	was	not	the	sole	founder	of	the	PKK,	but	he	fixed	that	by	purging	his	
fellow	co-founders	and	consolidating	the	group’s	story	behind	him.		
9. Yes.	The	organization	of	the	PKK	was	incredibly	centralized	with	all	decisions	
flowing	from	Öcalan	down.	Other	leaders	within	the	PKK	were	simply	there	to	
execute	the	will	of	the	leader.		
10. Yes.	Öcalan	was	incredibly	intolerant	of	individuals	within	the	PKK	who	threatened	
his	authority.	He	conducted	frequent	purges	within	the	organization	to	ensure	that	
leaders	could	not	establish	their	own	following	within	the	organization	and	his	
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purges	were	notorious	for	targeting	even	those	who	were	close	to	him.	He	even	
tried	to	have	his	own	wife	assassinated.		
11. Yes.	Although	he	wasn’t	officially	its	leader	at	the	time,	his	decision	to	switch	tactics	
to	negotiating	with	the	Turkish	state	after	being	captured	illustrates	how	strong	his	
charismatic	authority	was	within	the	organization.		
12. 	Yes.		
13. Yes.	As	stated	earlier	other	leaders	within	the	PKK	were	transactional,	functioning	
as	tools	to	execute	the	will	of	Öcalan.		
14. Yes.	The	other	leaders	within	the	PKK	all	relied	on	their	personal	relation	with	
Öcalan	to	gain	their	positions,	and	when	that	relationship	deteriorated,	they	were	
quickly	purged.		
Charismatic	Authority	of	Osama	Bin	Laden256	
1. Yes.	Osama	Bin	Laden	barrowed	heavily	from	Islamic	cultures	and	practices	to	
enhance	his	own	charismatic	authority.	He	was	very	conscious	about	presenting	
himself	as	an	excellent	and	devout	Muslim.		
2. Yes.	The	basis	for	Al	Qaeda	was	that	Middle	Eastern	regimes	were	secular	and	did	
not	represent	the	values	of	Islam.	This	dissatisfaction	with	traditional	society	led	
individuals	to	Al	Qaeda.	
3. Yes.	Osama	Bin	Laden	had	distinguished	himself	in	the	Soviet	Afghan	war	as	a	
military	commander.	He	quickly	built	up	a	myth	about	his	leadership	abilities.		
																																								 																					
256	Information	for	this	scale	compiled	from	Peter	Bergen	and	Paul	Cruickshank	“Revisiting	the	
Early	Al	Qaeda:	An	Updated	Account	of	its	Formative	Years,”	Studies	in	Conflict	and	
Terrorism,	Vol.	35,	2012,	1-36.	And	Rohan	Gunaratna	and	Aviv	Oreg	“Al	Qaeda’s	
Organizational	Structure	and	its	Evolution,”	Studies	in	Conflict	and	Terrorism,	Vol.	33,	2010,	
1043-1078.	
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4. No.	Unlike	some	charismatic	leaders,	Osama	Bin	Laden	did	not	use	a	physical	
disability	as	a	means	to	enhance	his	charismatic	authority.		
5. Yes,.Osama	Bin	Laden	frequently	paid	homage	to	traditional	Islamic	authority	as	a	
way	to	enhance	his	own	authority	within	Al	Qaeda.		
6. Yes.	Osama	Bin	Laden	was	frequently	claimed	to	be	the	only	figure	in	the	Arab	world	
who	could	defeat	the	West.		
7. Sort	of.	There	was	less	an	emphasis	on	individual	members	being	socialized	but	a	
greater	emphasis	on	existing	organizations	that	were	incorporated	into	Al	Qaeda	
recognizing	the	supreme	authority	of	Osama	Bin	Laden.			
8. Yes.	Osama	Bin	Laden	founded	Al	Qaeda	with	his	own	capital.	He	was	essential	to	
the	story	of	the	group.		
9. Yes.	Osama	Bin	Laden	was	the	ultimate	authority	within	Al	Qaeda.	He	dictated	the	
direction	and	goals	of	the	organization	to	underlings	who	worked	to	fulfill	his	
wishes.		
10. Yes.	Although	there	were	other	leaders	within	Al	Qaeda,	they	were	all	secondary	to	
Osama	Bin	Laden	and	decisions	by	other	leaders	always	had	to	be	justified	in	terms	
of	what	Bin	Laden	wanted.		
11. Yes.	The	switch	of	Al	Qaeda	from	trying	to	overthrow	Arab	regimes	to	targeting	
Western	countries	is	a	good	example.		
12. Yes.	Osama	Bin	Laden	effectively	reorganized	the	priorities	of	Al	Qaeda	without	
losing	the	faith	of	the	members	of	the	organization.		
13. Yes.	The	organization	of	Al	Qaeda	was	incredibly	centralized	and	reliant	on	the	
authority	of	Osama	Bin	Laden.		
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14. Yes.	All	of	the	upper	level	leaders	within	Al	Qaeda	had	close	personal	relationships	
with	Osama	Bin	Laden.		
Criteria	for	High	Levels	of	Institutionalization257	
1. Do	the	structures	in	place	in	the	organization	reduce	uncertainty	during	an	external	
shock?	
2. How	well	known	is	the	structure	of	the	organization	to	its	individual	members?	
3. How	many	resources	does	the	organization	have	at	its	disposal?	
4. Are	there	effective	lines	of	secure	communication	within	the	organization?	
5. Does	the	organization	have	access	to	external	forms	of	legitimacy?	
6. Does	the	organization	have	access	to	internal	forms	of	legitimacy?	
7. How	effectively	is	the	organization	able	to	recruit	members?	
8. Is	the	organization	able	to	maintain	complex	linkages	between	different	actors?	
9. How	well	integrated	is	the	organization?	
10. How	strong	is	the	motivation	of	individuals	within	the	organization	to	work	toward	its	
goals.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																					
257	These	criteria	were	inspired	by	Rene	Bakker,	Jörg	Raab,	and	Brinton	Milward,	“A	
preliminary	theory	of	dark	networks	resilience.”	Journal	of	Policy	Analysis	and	Management,	
Vol.	31,	No.	1,	Winter	2012,	33-62.		
